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Abstract 
 
Africa’s rising international profile and geopolitical significance as well as the 
continent’s relatively ‘under-exploited markets’ have been pull factors for many 
emerging economies. Globally, the developing and emerging economies of the world 
for the first time captured more than half of all global FDI in 2011.  Changes in the 
global investment regime are a clear indication of the changing dynamics in the global 
economy. Since India and China’s FDI liberalisation processes began to gather steam 
in the 1990s, they have been amongst the most aggressive of the emerging economy 
investors. This study appraises the role of the government in facilitating investment by 
Indian and Chinese firms abroad, specifically Sub-Saharan Africa. The study analyses 
the motivations for such outward foreign direct invest flows, the sectoral trends, and 
the entry mode differences of Indian and Chinese firms’ investments in Sub-Saharan 
African markets. Yet, there is a lack of studies that focus on both Indian and Chinese 
investments in Sub-Saharan Africa.   
 
Drawing from theoretical constructs from political economy, International business 
/economics and International Political Economy - a framework is provided to assess 
the influence of these investments. The methodology is interpretive and qualitative 
and draws largely on secondary material from international organisations, government 
agencies, academic literature and the media. The study finds that the role of New 
Delhi and Beijing in facilitating and financing outward investments is strategic and 
pragmatic. These policies greatly influence firms, and the locations and types of their 
investments.    
 
South-South cooperation provides India and China with a framework for long-term 
political and economic investments and development cooperation with African states.  
India and China’s engagements in Sub-Saharan Africa share similar and dissimilar 
forms and motivations for FDI. Markets and resources are primary motivations for 
these two countries’ firms to invest in the region.  India and China’s growing 
commercial activities in Sub-Saharan Africa provide the region with opportunities for 
further international market integration and development.  
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Opsomming 
 
Afrika se ontluikende internasionale profiel en geopolitieke belang tesame met die 
vasteland se relatief ‘onderbenutte’ markte is ’n trekfaktor vir baie ontluikende 
ekonomieë. Terwyl vloeie uit buitelandse direkte investering (BDI) na Afrika, wat ’n 
hoogtepunt in 2008 bereik het, in 2010 steeds afgeneem het, was die ontwikkelende 
en ontluikende ekonomieë van die wêreld vir die eerste keer in besit van meer as die 
helfte van alle wêreldwye BDI in 2011. Veranderings in die internasionale 
beleggingsregime is ’n duidelike aanduiding van die veranderende dinamika in die 
wêreldekonomie. Sedert Indië en China se liberaliseringsprosesse met betrekking tot 
BDI in die 1990’s begin ontwikkel het, is hulle van die aggressiefste beleggers onder 
opkomende ekonomieë.  Die gebrek aan streekstudies wat op Indiese en Chinese 
beleggings fokus, verg egter verdere aandag.  
 
Die doel van die studie is om die rol van die regering in die fasilitering van Indiese en 
Chinese maatskappye om in die buiteland te belê te ontleed. Die fokus val veral op 
Afrika suid van die Sahara, en op die motiverings vir hierdie BDI-vloeie, die 
sektortendense en wyse van toetreding van Indiese en Chinese maatskappye se 
beleggings in Afrikamarkte.  
 
Bestande uit teortiese konstakke uit internasionale sakestudie, internasionale politieke 
ekonomie en politieke ekonomie, word ‘n raamwerk waarin die invloed van hierdie 
beleggings op wat assesseer word is interpritiet en kwalitatiet en stan op sekondêre 
materiaal en data van regeringsagentskappe, akademiese literatuur en die media. Die 
gebruik van ’n veelsoortige teoretiese raamwerk wat ekonomiese en politieke 
beleggingsverskynsels uitbeeld, illustreer die versoenbaarheid van politiek, ekonomie 
en sakegebaseerde akademiese gebiede en die moontlikheid om grondliggende 
uitkomste uitkomste vir navorsing oor beleggingstendense en -strategieë in 
ontluikende ekonomieë te bied.   
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Die studie bevind dat die rol van New Delhi en Beijing in die fasilitering en 
finansiering van buitelandse beleggings strategiese en pragmaties is, en dat beleide 
maatskappye grootliks beïnvloed ten opsigte van waar hulle belê en watter soort 
beleggings hulle maak. Verder, verskaf Suid–Suid-samewerking, ‘n raamwerk vir 
verbintenis langtermyn- politieke en ekonomiese beleggings en 
ontwikkelingsamewerking met Afrikastate. Indië en  China se betrokkenheid in Afrika 
toon ooreenstemmende en verskillende vorme en motiverings vir BDI, en markte en 
hulpbronne is primêre motiverings vir hierdie twee lande se maatskappye in die streek 
te belê.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s scholarly debate and attention began to centre on the 
growth and driving forces of South-South economic relations, and their possible 
implications for the global economy (Pedersen, 2008: 613). A defining feature of the 
growth of South-South economic relations was the advent of emerging economy 
multinationals, such as those from India and China. Closely linked to the debate on 
the relations was “the political struggle by leading developing countries to establish a 
New International Economic Order with the prospects of achieving” collective 
development and economic independence (Pedersen, 2008: 613). India and China’s 
economies have in the last decade grown exponentially, placing them as the leading 
emerging economies in the global economy (Deng, 2007: 71).   
 
The last two decades have seen outward foreign direct investment flows from India 
and China increase significantly when both countries initiated new waves of OFDI in 
which accelerated from 2000 onwards (Hong, 2011: 5). The current economic 
activities that Africa and Asia have engaged in continue to be a defining feature of a 
changing global economic order. Increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) between 
Asia and Africa, while smaller than the increases in trade, remain one of the defining 
features of this growing economic engagement (Broadman, 2008; Winters and Yusuf, 
2007: 2). India and China have emerged as Africa’s most important contemporary 
economic partners and these powerful economies are having a significant effect on the 
continent’s international relations (Cheru and Obi, 2011: 91). This has attributed to 
increasingly high external demands for commodities, mainly hydrocarbons and 
minerals. Market opportunities for trade and investment are expected to grow, despite 
the economic and fiscal crises in the global economy (Baldauf, 2011; Broadman, 
2007: 1). India and China have not only opened and expanded their trade and 
investment activities on the continent, but their diplomatic and political channels too. 
Strategic objectives, resources, new markets, diplomacy and influence, development 
cooperation, energy and food security are some of the channels that Indian, Chinese 
and African states are engaging in (Pradhan, 2010: 140).   
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1.1.2 The Region of Focus: Sub-Saharan Africa 
Africa, home to 55 independent states that comprise more than a quarter of the United 
Nations membership, is a continent that is gaining more political and economic clout 
at the international level (Desai, 2009: 412). Sub-Saharan Africa, the focus of this 
study, geographically excluding ‘North Africa,’ is a region of 48 states. Africa’s 
‘under-exploited markets’ are a significant ‘pull’ factor for many emerging 
economies.  As noted by Broadman (2007a: 2),  
 
“India and China have rapidly modernizing industries and burgeoning middle 
classes with rising incomes and purchasing power…the result is a demand not 
only for natural resource-extractive commodities, agricultural goods such as 
cotton, and other traditional African exports, but also more diversified, non-
traditional exports such as processed commodities, light manufactured 
products, household consumer goods, food and tourism.” 
 
India and China’s engagement in Africa is being solidified through new bi-lateral and 
multilateral forums, such as the Asia-Africa summit, the China-African Business 
Council, The Forum on China-African Cooperation (FOCAC), the India-Africa 
Project Partnership and the India Brazil South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum (Cheru 
and Obi, 2011: 92).  In the post – Cold War era India and China have continued to 
“articulate and pursue Africa (sic) strategies, hinged on South-South solidarity, win-
win equal partnership and mutual respect and benefits” (Cheru and Obi, 2011: 95). 
Relations between African states and other emerging economies and regions are not 
only attracting a great deal of “academic and public attention” but are experiencing 
the effects of the global economic power shift (Mawsdely and McCann, 2010: 81; 
Alden and Davis, 2006: 83).  
 
1.1.3 FDI Outflows and Emerging Market Multinationals  
Outward and inward foreign direct investment is a mode by which emerging market 
economies and at times their government access new technologies, markets, know-
how and strategic or other resources.  
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At the end of 2009, 16 per cent of global outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) 
originated from developing or emerging economies (Ahearn, 2011: 22). The corporate 
transformation of India and China is characterised by the increasing 
internationalisation of India and Chinese multinational firms through substantial 
outward foreign direct investment flows across the globe (Athreeye and Kapur, 2009: 
209). From modest beginnings in the post – World War II era, firms from India began 
to expand into foreign markets as early as the late 1950s (Pradhan and Sauvant, 2010: 
1). While India would have only a fleeting group of outward investors in the 
formative years after independence, it would be in the post-economic liberalisation 
phase that a new wave of investments would materialise.  
 
Through government support, ambitious management, low costs, home market profits 
and modern facilities, firms such as Haier Company, Lenovo, ZTE and Huawei from 
China as well as India’s Infosys, Tata Group and Bharti Airtel are expanding 
overseas, transforming industries and markets in emerging and developed regions of 
the globe (Ahearn, 2011: 22; BCG, 2011: 6). India currently has eight multinationals 
in the Fortune Global 500 and China has sixty-one (CNNmoney, 2011).   
 
1.1.4 Rationale  
Large scale outward foreign direct investment by emerging economy multinationals 
from countries such as India and China have become an increasingly important 
feature of global business and reflect a changing orientation of economic power in the 
world (Luo et al., 2010: 68). Emerging economies, especially the Brazil, Russia, India 
and China (BRIC) grouping, illustrate the attention that these economies have been 
given by experts covering the change in global economic power.  
 
An important part of the rising profile of emerging economies growing economic 
powers is their interest in Africa- with its untapped market potential and large reserves 
of sought after resources in hydrocarbons, minerals and metals. India and China are 
two Asian countries that have an increasingly visible presence in the continent- 
whether in trade, investment or aid.  
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Many of India and China’s top firms have invested into Africa, as they seek to acquire 
strategic assets, new markets and resources (UNCTAD, 2006). The research problem 
is set within the growing economic and political relations between India and China 
and Sub-Saharan Africa, which focuses on the flow of investments from India and 
China to the region, and detailing the types of firms  
 
Studies focusing on India and China’s outward investments and their various 
multinationals can be found in a variety of academic fields, from branches of politics 
and economics to business studies and finance. The breadth and the diffusion across 
many academic fields in which research on Indian and Chinese investments and 
multinationals in Africa is found, provides an opportunity to present a macro study. A 
macro study is geared towards analysing both Indian and Chinese investments and 
multinationals in Sub-Saharan Africa in an integrated study, drawing on a theoretical 
framework that provides explanations of the political and economic components that 
influence the outbound investments of firms, as they invest in host economies.  
 
1.2 The Research Question 
1.2.1 Background to the Research Question 
The limitations of the availability of studies on Indian and Chinese OFDI and 
multinationals are not extensive, but there remain limitations in the approaches that 
contemporary studies have taken. There are studies that approached the research on 
OFDI and internationalisation of firms from a Chinese and Indian perspective such as 
Hong (2011) and Athreye and Kapur (2009). Others have focused primarily on 
China’s OFDI and multinationals such as Peng (2003), Corkin (2007) and Alden and 
Davis (2006).  Studies on India’s OFDI and multinationals include Hattari and Rajan 
(2010), Nayyar (2008) and Pal (2010). While these authors contribute to the study, 
their research has illustrated limitations. Broadman (2011) notes that the majority of 
texts on emerging economies in Africa tend to be biased, focusing primarily on China, 
which presents a challenge to researchers as “serious methodological questions about 
the quality of these analyses’ policy conclusions and trend prognostications” arise.  
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These studies can be further complimented by better framing India and Chinese OFDI 
and multinationals in investment paths that account for push and pull factors in the 
home and host economy and the motives, sectoral orientation, business strategies and 
entry modes. The research question is set within the contemporary academic 
discourses on emerging economies and their growing political and economic interests 
in Africa. A key aim of the study is to narrow the scope of inquiry on the expanding 
economic interests and role of India and China in Sub-Saharan Africa to a macro-
analysis, but broaden it within this scope that includes all the fundamentals of the 
internationalisation of Indian and Chinese firms in Sub-Saharan Africa. The research 
question that underlies the study is rationalised by the need to establish a research 
question that can address the limitations in the literature. The primary research 
question is: 
 
“What motivates Indian and Chinese firms to engage in outward foreign direct 
investment in Sub-Saharan Africa and to what extent do New Delhi and Beijing’s 
political and economic policies influence the internationalisation of these firms into 
Sub-Saharan African host economies?”  
 
1.2.2 Secondary Research Questions 
The following secondary questions are drawn from the primary research question and 
consider the broader questions of India and China’s investments in Africa. 
1. What forms of FDI are India and Chinese firms engaged in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and what is the sectoral orientation of these firms?  
2. What advantages do Indian and Chinese firms exploit when expanding into 
Africa and are the motivations for such investments driven primarily by 
‘push’ factors in the home economy or ‘pull’ factors in the host economy 
or possibly both?  
3. What are the forms of ownership of Indian and Chinese firms investing in 
Sub-Saharan Africa? 
4. What are the similarities and differences of Indian and Chinese 
investments in Sub-Saharan Africa? 
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1.3 Aim of the Research 
The primary aim of this research is to conduct a macro analysis of the political 
economy of Indian and Chinese multinational firms and foreign direct investment in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, incorporating the broader context of emerging economies and 
South-South cooperation, in which this occurs. The depth of the study calls for a 
macro analysis which can illustrate macro trends, motivations and strategies of India 
and Chinese firms. The study, while not wholly comparative, elucidates the ‘differing 
engagements’ of India and China in Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, the aim is to 
analyse New Delhi and Beijing’s commercial activities, the characteristics of these 
activities and their implications for the region.   
 
1.4 The Theoretical Framework  
The study focuses on the political economy of Indian and Chinese OFDI and 
multinationals in Africa. The central theoretical framework of the study is informed 
by political economy, International business/economics (IB/IE) and international 
Political Economy. The study is aimed at political and economic factors that influence 
the internationalisation of Indian and Chinese firms in Africa. Such a framework 
includes analysing the political and economic policies of the home economy that 
prompt firms to internationalise, and ‘pull’ factors in the host economy that influence 
the location of firms’ outward investments. Political economy, IB, IE and IPE cannot 
in their own capacities provide such a framework, but can contribute to a broader 
framework, one that would be able to provide the necessary means to resolve the 
research question.    
 
1.4.1 Political Economy 
Political institutions play an important role as the authority on pursuing economic 
governance, providing incentives and place regulations on foreign investment (Kehl, 
2009:3). Government and institutions “develop institutions to raise revenue and 
stimulate economic growth in response to political and economic interests” (Kehl, 
2009:3). Furthermore, “political economy emphasises the importance of factors such 
as market access, trade practice, taxation, and the level of intervention in market 
forces” (Kehl, 2009: 4).  
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Political economy provides a framework within which the political and economic 
aspects of the home economy of a firm can be assessed with the aim of determining 
the policy implications of the home economy’s institutions and the extent to which 
political and economic policies influence the outward investment of firms. 
 
1.4.2 International Business and Economics 
While political economy focuses on the role that political and economic policy play in 
influencing firm’s investments abroad, International business/economics provides an 
explanatory framework for the motivations, modes of entry, and types of foreign 
direct investment firms engage in to expand into markets or a host economy. The four 
main motivations for FDI that Cohen (2007) and UNCTAD (2006) list are market-
seeking, resource-seeking, efficiency-seeking and created/strategic-asset-seeking FDI. 
IB has further contributed to the study,  with the inclusion of Dunning’s eclectic 
paradigm or ownership, location and internalisation (OLI) model which focuses on 
advantages that firm’s require in order to internationalise.  
 
Firms vs. Multinationals  
The study differentiates between firms and multinationals. A firm that 
internationalises from a home economy into one or more host economies is 
considered to be multinational. According to Dunning and Lundan (2008: 3) a 
multinational “is an enterprise that engages in foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
owns or, controls value-added activities in more than one country.” The firms that are 
mentioned in the India and China chapters are all considered to be multinational or 
transnational corporations or enterprises, depending on the context and reference as 
different authors and institutions use varying terms to describe such entities.  
 
The prospect of seeking out new explanatory frameworks for emerging multinationals 
is suggested to be less than pertinent as the “observers of emerging economy 
multinational enterprises (EMNEs) remain sceptical that any new theory is required to 
explain their activities… the traditional theory of FDI is internationalisation theory” 
(Rugman, 2009: 60). This study does, where applicable, refer to Indian and Chinese 
firms as emerging market multinationals; however this term does not conform to the 
definition used in IB literature.  
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1.4.3 International Political Economy 
International Political Economy does not constitute a large portion of the theoretical 
framework but is included as the perspective that is used in this thesis, the manner in 
which actors such as states and firms are analysed, is done so within the economic 
nationalist perspective. The perspective views all economic activity has being defined 
by the state and that that change within the global economy is the result of state action 
and less the result of liberalisation. The economic nationalist perspective allows the 
political economy perspective to be more articulated in the research by better 
accounting for the role of states in the institutional realm of policy formulation and its 
influence on outward investment. 
 
1.5 Research Methodology 
The research question is: “What motivates Indian and Chinese firms to engage in 
outward foreign direct investment in Sub-Saharan Africa and to what extent do New 
Delhi and Beijing’s political and economic policies influence the internationalisation 
of these firms into Sub-Saharan African host economies?”   
 
The approach to this study is one which is exploratory and qualitative. The research 
question is exploratory, which is empirical in nature. In order to resolve an empirical 
question, the study can either collect new data or can analyse existing data (Mouton, 
2001: 53). The research and data that this study draws on is informed by existing 
research on the political economy of Indian and Chinese OFDI and multinationals in 
Sub-Saharan Africa set in published academic literature, journals and handbooks, 
government statistical and policy reports, non-governmental organisations reports and 
print and electronic media sources. Key trends, facts and figures of FDI flows into 
Sub-Saharan Africa are drawn from published reports by the United Nations, such as 
the World Investment Report, The Reserve Bank of India Bulletins and the Chinese 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) Statistical Bulletins. Qualitative analysis 
“involves the continual interplay between theory and analysis” (Babbie, 2010: 418). 
The qualitative analysis of the existing research and its interpretation is guided by the 
theoretical framework outlined in the study, which consists of political economy, 
international business/economics and IPE. Through this analysis the study will 
provide the findings necessary to resolve the primary and secondary research 
questions.   
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The findings of the analysis are presented in chapters in three to six.    
 
1.6 Operationalisation of Key Terms 
• Africa: The second largest continent, comprising 55 independent sovereign 
states.   
• Sub-Saharan Africa: The geographical region of the African continent that lies 
south of the Sarah Desert, comprising 48 states, including Sudan and South 
Sudan. (UNSTATS, 2011). Referred to in the study as either Sub-Saharan 
Africa or region.  
• Sudan: The Republic of Sudan (1956 – 2011), as it was prior to the schism of 
the state and establishment of the Republic of South Sudan. 
 
1.7 Delimitations and Limitations 
The study is delimited geographically to Sub-Saharan Africa and is geared towards a 
macro study of India and Chinese firms in Africa. The research scope is delimited to 
the period 1999 – 2011. India and China have both engaged in OFDI at one period or 
another since their independence in 1947 and 1949 respectively; however their 
outward investment drives only began to gain traction in the 1990s, when India began 
liberalising its economy from 1991 onwards and China implemented its Going Global 
Strategy in 1999 (Brautigam, 2009: 74).     
 
The study is limited by the empirical research available on Indian and Chinese firms 
and FDI in Africa, especially empirical and sectoral specific statistical data on 
internationalisation and motivations for FDI. Furthermore, such empirical research is 
not wholly set within the realm of Political Science but extends into other more varied 
academic fields. This results in the study adopting a macro approach to the research 
question. A second key limitation has been the inability to wholly use a single 
theoretical approach to the research.  
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Due to the literature on the investments of Indian and Chinese firms in Africa being 
spread across many fields of inquiry, the theoretical framework is limited to the 
available literature detailing Indian and Chinese investments and multinationals, 
resulting in a study that uses three fields of inquiry to account for the phenomenon of 
the expansion of firms and later multinationals and outward foreign direct investment.  
 
1.8 Thesis Structure 
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework  
Chapter 2 outlines the theoretical framework that is used in the study. The theoretical 
framework is discussed systematically, reviewing the contributions from political 
economy, International business/economics and International Political Economy to 
the literature on outward foreign direct investment and multinationals. Finally, the 
chapter describes the application of the theory to chapters four and five, which cover 
India and Chinese OFDI and multinationals in Sub-Saharan Africa.   
 
Chapter 3: India, China and Africa: South-South Cooperation and the Global 
Economy 
Chapter 3 contextualises the study by reviewing the nature of Indo and Sino-African 
relations, giving an overview of trends in FDI, trade and development, South-South 
cooperation and the contemporary global economy. A section contrasting the differing 
engagements of India and China with Africa is discussed, expanding on how India 
and China have developed their ties with African states. The final part of the chapter 
briefly discusses the implications of Indian and Chinese involvement in Africa.  
 
Chapter 4: The Political Economy of Indian Outward Foreign Direct Investment and 
Multinationals 
Chapter 4 reviews the political economy of Indian FDI motivations, drivers of 
internationalisation and multinationals in Africa in a macro analysis. The theoretical 
framework provides the construct in which these phenomena are be analysed. The 
first part of the chapter focuses on the political economy and the role of government 
in defining policies that influence FDI and multinationals. The second part of the 
chapter outlines the drivers for internationalisation and the motivations for FDI under 
which firm’s expanded into host economies. A conclusion outlines the key findings of 
the analysis.  
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Chapter 5: The Political Economy of Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment and 
Multinationals 
Chapter 5 reviews the political economy of Chinese FDI motivations, drivers of 
internationalisation and multinationals in Africa in a macro analysis. The chapter 
reviews the Chinese institutional and political economy and business strategies of 
Chinese firms.  The theoretical framework provides the construct in which these 
phenomena will be analysed to which a conclusion is presented outlining the key 
findings.  
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
The final chapter of the study presents the findings of the research. It addresses the 
primary and second questions that were asked in chapter 1 with the findings of the 
study. Suggestions for further research in the field of emerging economies, such as 
India and China in Sub-Saharan Africa are made. The final section provides a 
conclusion to the chapter.   
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Chapter 2: The Theoretical Framework 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter of the study provides a review of the theoretical framework, outlining the 
theoretical contributions of political economy, International business/economics and 
International Political Economy to the analysis of India and Chinese outward foreign direct 
investment and multinationals in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
  
2.2 Review of the Theory  
2.2.1 A Political Economy Framework 
The term ‘political economy’ has been redefined over several centuries. According to Adam 
Smith (1723-1790), a pioneer of political economy, it was the “science of managing a 
nation’s resource so as to generate wealth” (Weingast and Wittman, 2006: 3). According to 
Karl Marx (1818-1883), political economy focused on how “the ownership of the means of 
production influenced historical processes” (Weingast and Wittman, 2006: 3). In the last 
century political economy has fallen in and out of conflicting definitions, being seen at times 
as a study of the interrelationship of economics and politics while at other times a 
methodological approach to a given research problem which in itself was not a singularity but 
divided between an economic approach, a public choice and a sociological approach. 
(Weingast and Wittman, 2006: 3).   
 
This thesis ascribes to the Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, definition of political 
economy as “a grand (if imperfect) synthesis of these various strands… political economy is 
the methodology of economics to the analysis of political behaviour and institutions… it is 
not a single, unified approach, but a family of approaches” (Weingast and Wittman, 2006).  
When applied to FDI and multinationals, a political economy analysis seeks to consider and 
draw conclusions on the political and economic aspects that either sustain or moderate such 
phenomena. Internationalisation from a political economy perspective provides an interesting 
scope as capital, represented by firms, requires a state-system in which to “defend its global 
interests” (Yeung and Liu, 2008: 61). The capital acquired through increasing 
internationalisation “tends to increase the relative power of transitional (firms) vis-à-vis the 
national states” (Yeung and Liu, 2008: 61). Firms are thus seen to “exploit spatial differences 
that transcend national boundaries” (Yeung and Liu, 2008: 61).  
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This perspective is more critical than the one put forward in IB which largely views such 
phenomena as beneficial to home and host economies and is contrasted by liberal and 
economic nationalist perspectives in IPE.  Nevertheless, in the field of political economy and 
its related literature, there is an understanding that economics alone is incapable of being able 
to explain the variances that exist between these nation states in economic growth, economic 
outcomes and policy choices (Alesina and Perotti, 1994: 351).  
 
2.2.2 International Political Economy (IPE) 
Introduction 
“The study of political economy and international political economy requires an analytic 
approach that takes into account economics, Political Science, and other social sciences” 
(Gilpin, 2001: 40). IPE has been developed on three major contending perspectives or 
schools of thought. Each of the major perspectives differs in their explanations and 
interpretations of change within the global political economy. The three major contending 
perspectives as outlined by O’Brien and Williams (2010) are economic nationalist, liberal 
and critical.  
 
2.2.3 IPE Perspectives 
The Economic Nationalist Perspective  
Gilpin (1987: 31) noted that in economic nationalism the central idea “is that economic 
activities are and should be subordinate to the goal of state-building and the interests of the 
state.” The perspective focuses on the state’s role and the critical nature of power in defining 
the nature of the global economy. This perspective sees IPE as one “constituted through the 
action of rational states… if international relations is the struggle for power, IPE is the 
struggle for power and wealth” (O’Brien and Williams, 2010: 19).  
 
The state is seen as the primary actor in the global economy, placing the primacy of politics 
above “other aspects of social life” (O’Brien and Williams, 2010: 19). While this perspective 
recognises the importance of market-based actors, the multinational for instance, these 
market-based actors remain limited in power and at the behest of the state. The increasing 
power afforded or attained by multinationals in the contemporary global order is seen not as 
an evolution of liberalising and globalising markets, but the state affording this power, 
through reduced controls on capital mobility.  
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Economic nationalism is similar to that of realism in International Relations Theory, in that it 
“recognises the anarchic nature of international affairs, the primacy of the state and its 
interests in international affairs, and the importance of power in interstate relations” (Gilpin, 
2001:14).   
 
The Liberal Perspective  
The liberal perspective of IPE has a broader range of actors that it takes note of, whether it is 
the multinational, interest groups or the state. The state in this perspective is not static or 
monolithic, but more dynamic and being defined by external factors. The international system 
is seen as one of interdependence as opposed to anarchy resulting in a positive-sum game. 
The global economy of today is one in which liberalism is the guiding doctrine, economic 
liberalisation and a trade regime geared towards free trade are tenants of an increasingly 
shifting and globalising international economy. Multinationals are viewed as being positive 
actors in the global economy that are advantageous to host and home economies.  
 
To the home state the multinational “represents an optimal mix of technology, managerial 
skill and capital” (O’Brien and Williams, 2010:22). To host states, multinationals enhance the 
domestic economy providing capital transfer, access to markets and technology (O’Brien and 
Williams, 2010: 22).  The market is central in economic life and the liberal IPE perspective 
stresses the role that open markets will have in enhancing growth and wealth in the global 
economy and the role of the multinational in facilitating this wealth to proliferate in the 
global economy.  
 
The Critical Perspective  
Reacting to the liberalist perspective, a selection of ‘critical’ IPE perspectives emerged in the 
nineteenth century. Lacking preoccupation with the individual and the state, these theories 
considered “other units of analysis” (O’Brien and Williams, 2010: 24).  These theories were 
termed ‘critical’ because they opposed traditional “forms of organisation” (O’Brien and 
Williams, 2010: 24). Critical theory is associated with three variants; Marxism, feminism and 
environmentalism. These specific critical theories identify and emphasise the “nature of 
oppression within and across societies and the struggle for justice waged by or on behalf of 
workers, women and the environment (O’Brien and Williams, 2010: 25). To critical theory, 
transnational production and the firm are seen as being oppressive and exploitative, 
especially towards the working class.  
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The concentration and centralising of capital, visible in the form of multinationals, is seen as 
a key feature of imperialism. Through the dominance of these multinationals, this is 
expressed in the global political economy (O’Brien and Williams, 2010: 25). Marxism is a 
key variant of the critical perspective which is class focused, seeing dominance and 
exploitation as indicative of the global political economy. Marxists view international 
economic relations as unstable and conflict prone because of the tendencies of capitalism 
(Barone, 1985: 10)  
 
Firstly, fierce competition amongst businesses and hence capital, place workers’ wages at the 
behest of falling profit and reductions of costs to increase profits falls squarely on workers. 
Secondly, capitalism creates uneven development as various centres grow and others decline. 
Lastly, capitalism leads to “overproduction or under consumption, giving rise to fluctuations 
in the business cycle and undermining social stability” (O’Brien and Williams, 2010: 26). 
Scholars within the critical perspective, similar to economic nationalism, see the international 
order and economic relations as a zero-sum game; global capitalism does not harbour 
cooperation, but rather reinforces existing conflictual tendencies within the international 
order. Ultimately, Marxists see the drive for profit by capitalists at the centre of the class 
struggle within the state and the global political economy (Barone, 1985: 103). 
 
2.2.4 IPE and the Firm 
Lorraine Eden (1991: 197) wrote an article calling for “bringing the firm back” into 
International Political Economy (IPE). Eden’s (1991) contributions to the firm are important 
to this study for the following reasons; firstly, Eden noted that firms in IPE literature were 
often “implicit rather than explicit” (Eden, 1991: 197). Secondly, that “IPE must come to 
terms with the globalisation of markets through multinational enterprises” (Eden, 1991: 198).  
Thirdly, Eden recognised the role that other fields of inquiry hold with regards to firms, 
specifically the contributions of IB.  
 
Fourthly, Eden discounts the conflict of states and markets in IPE exclaiming “the concept of 
states versus markets is… flawed because the market is a structure, not an actor, and hence a 
poor counterpoint to the state…the appropriate counter point is the multinational 
enterprise…the key nonstate actor dominating both domestic and international markets” 
(Eden, 1991: 197).  
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2.3 Foreign Direct Investment  
2.3.1 Background 
Foreign direct investment is “an international capital flow recorded in the balance of 
payments in which an MNC establishes control over and a lasting interest in corporate assets 
in a host country” (Walter and Sen, 2009: 191). FDI is a critical component of the global 
economy and is increasing alongside emerging economy firms who have begun to constitute 
larger portions of global FDI flows.   
 
The forms of FDI all share a common denominator; the motivation of firms to invest abroad 
because “prospective financial rewards outweigh the projected costs of launching and 
overseas subsidiary” (Cohen, 2007: 66).Cohen (2007: 37) notes four ways in which the term 
FDI can be used. Firstly, as a “corporate activity that confers the status of multinational on 
certain firms… it is what MNCs do to become MNCs.” Secondly, FDI is a financial activity 
that consists of a capital flow from a home economy to a host economy with the purpose of 
“acquiring partial or full ownership” of a business, which could be a manufacturing plant, an 
extractive facility or a wholesale distribution system (Cohen, 2007: 37). In international 
finance, FDI has effects on the balance of payments of both home and host economies 
(Cohen, 2007: 37). Thirdly, FDI can be used as a generic term to “designate the economic 
policies toward MNCs and international investment flows maintained by governments” 
(Cohen, 2007: 37). Finally, FDI can be a general term used by agencies to gauge in monetary 
terms yearly incoming and outgoing flow and cumulative value of inbound investments “on a 
country-by-country basis” (Cohen, 2007: 37).  
 
A majority of FDI, as a means of expanding into a host economy, can be found in greenfield 
and mergers and acquisitions (M&As).  More than three-quarters of global FDI is located in 
M&As of existing firms, as opposed to ‘greenfield investments’ (Walter and Gautam, 2009: 
191). Greenfield investments are when FDI constitutes the development of a new company in 
a host economy; hypothetically it involves the construction of new facilities (Cohen, 2007: 
27). M&As are investments in which a foreign firm concludes the acquisition of an existing 
firm or company in a host economy. This is done through the purchasing of “voting stock in 
the local corporation” (Cohen, 2007: 73).  
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According to Walter and Sen (2009) there are two forms of FDI: vertical and horizontal. This 
differentiation falls in line with Cohen’s (2007) varieties or motivations as forms are not 
motivations. Vertical FDI “entails the production of intermediate inputs in more than one 
location for the manufacture of a final product and is associated primarily with the search for 
lower costs via global supply chain management” (Walter and Sen, 2009: 198).Horizontal 
FDI “involves the production of final output in different national locations and is motivated 
primarily by the desire for proximity to the end market” (Walter and Sen, 2009: 198).  
 
2.3.2 Drivers of Internationalisation  
Firms in a home economy may be driven to internationalise due to certain ‘drivers’ that 
prompt firms to internationalise (UNCATD, 2006: 155). There are three types of drivers; 
push, which originate in the home economy, pull which are found in the host economy and 
policy in the home and host economy (UNCATD, 2006: 155). These drivers will prompt 
firms to exploit their competitive advantages, as outlined by Dunning’s eclectic paradigm, to 
internationalisation. The motivations and strategies for this internationalisation manifest in 
the types of FDI that firms engage in. 
 
Home Economy Drivers 
Home economy drivers refer to conditions that prompt the domestic firm to internationalise 
and include market and trade conditions, production costs, government policy and local 
business conditions. Emerging economies will have growing economies, but these economies 
could be limited in terms of scale and opportunities pushing firms abroad. Production costs in 
the home economy may increase due to rapid expansion, as has occurred in China, where 
labour costs have increased as the middle class grows. This would push firms to seek out host 
economies with lower production costs (UNCTAD, 2006: 155). Many firms, especially those 
from India and China stress the importance of governmental policy in the home economy as a 
push factor and as a pull factor in the host economy (UNCTAD, 2006: 157).  Local business 
conditions trigger internationalisation in many ways but often competitive pressures in the 
home economy by either domestic firms or multinationals are primary reasons. China’s rapid 
increase in OFDI is partly attributed to competition in the domestic economy (UNCTAD, 
2006: 156).  
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Host Economy Drivers 
Market factors are often the most important determinants of FDI in host economies. 
Developed economies are attractive due to their large markets, highly-skilled labour and 
technology (UNCTAD, 2006: 155). Developing economies are attractive for different 
reasons, as their economies expand and the demands for new goods and services increase, 
market dynamism will attract firms to capitalise on new business opportunities (UNCTAD, 
2006: 155). The location and diversification of the host economy will also prove important 
for firms when gauging possible outcomes of their investments (UNCTAD, 2006: 155).    
 
2.3.3 Motivations of FDI 
The previous section on drivers of internationalisation outlined why firms may choose to 
internationalise and invest abroad through either or both, push and pull factors (UNCTAD, 
2006: 157). However, push and pull factors “are not sufficient to explain the final choice of 
host locations: an understanding of TNCs’ (firms’) motives, strategies and context is needed” 
(UNCTAD, 158: 2006).   
 
Table 1: FDI Motivations and Economic Determinants in Host Economies 
FDI Motivations Main Economic Determinants in Host Economies 
Market-seeking • Market size and per capita income 
• Market growth 
• Access to regional and global markets 
• Country specific consumer preferences 
• Structure of markets 
Resource-seeking • Availability of natural resources (natural gas, oils, minerals 
• Endowment of cheap unskilled labour 
• Presence of adequate skilled labour force 
• Level and quality of infrastructure  
Efficiency-seeking • Lower cost of resources and intermediate inputs, adjusted for 
productivity of labour resources 
• Membership of a regional integration agreement conducive to the 
establishment of regional corporate networks 
Created/Strategic asset-
seeking 
• Technological and other created assets (e.g. brand names), 
including as embodied in individuals, firms and clusters.  
Source: Adapted from (Pradhan, 2010a)  
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Market-Seeking FDI 
Market-seeking FDI is the most common strategy of FDI for emerging economy 
multinationals in the internationalisation process, and this is no different India and China in 
Africa (UNCTAD, 2006: 158). The establishment of a firm abroad to either protect or expand 
a market is considered market-seeking FDI. The core motivation behind market-seeking FDI 
is one that is both “defensive and proactive” (Cohen, 2007: 68).  The firm is motivated to 
expand into another economy, a host state, in order to better serve existing and potential 
clientèle by establishing facilities that are proximate to these customers.  The defensive 
strategy is found in the mitigation of such factors as rising local competition, import barriers, 
and appreciation in the home economies’ currency. Proactive reasoning would see the firm 
reduce transaction and transportation costs of its goods and/or services.  
 
Host economy advantage will be established when the firm can adapt to local trends, perceive 
change and market itself as a ‘home’ business, providing employment and economic stimulus 
to the local economy. “Market-seeking FDI has the potential to provide more benefits to host 
countries than any other form of incoming direct investment” (Cohen, 2007: 68). 
 
Efficiency-Seeking FDI  
Efficiency-seeking is different from resource-seeking or market-seeking FDI and “produces 
distinctive behavioural patterns and economic effects” (Cohen, 2007: 69). It is a form of FDI 
often undertaken by “advanced developing countries” (UNCTAD, 2006: xxvii). Reduction of 
costs is a common motivation for firms to invest internationally. There are two rationales for 
this motivation; one is the establishment of a subsidiary in a low-wage economy. The second 
rationale is to “achieve economies of scale” (Cohen, 2007: 69) Pressure to reduce per unit 
costs of capital-intensive goods that have “high upfront and manufacturing costs” encourages 
the multinational to sell “these goods in every national market of any significant size” 
(Cohen, 2007: 69). “Whether the objective is highly skilled labour, very cheap labour, or 
strategic geographic location, this form of FDI has an above-average likelihood of generating 
increased foreign exchange earnings for host countries” (Cohen, 2007: 70). Multinationals 
seeking to cut production costs are attracted by differences in factor endowments, most 
notably an ample labour supply.  
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Efficiency seeking FDI is largely unimportant for Chinese firms and only marginally more 
important to Indian firms who see efficiency as “primarily the synergies to be gained through 
the international integration of production and service” (UNCTAD, 2006: 160).  
 
Resource Seeking FDI 
Following the Second World War, in a recovering and restructuring global economy, 
resource-seeking FDI constituted the majority of total global FDI. Resource-seeking 
multinationals were thus the dominant business actors in the post-war era. These 
multinationals sought non-renewable resources, minerals and metals such as oil, gas, gold 
and copper as well as renewable resources such as fruit, coffee and rubber. The determinant 
as to where this FDI is directed is paramount. There are two primary determinants in such 
FDI; namely location and climate. The physicality of mineral location and whether climatic 
conditions are favourable for sufficient crop yields. The other determinants are location 
based; infrastructure, accessibility to such mineral resources, the accommodation of the host 
state and its governance, “favourable tax and regulatory policies, and the rule of law” (Cohen, 
2007: 66).   
 
Resource-seeking FDI and associated multinationals’ operations in the primary sector have 
been largely criticised, unlike those of the manufacturing and services and majority of 
resource-seeking FDI can be found in lesser-developed countries. A distinguishing 
characteristic of resource-seeking FDI is that the extracted resources are not procured for sale 
into other economies, instead these resources are exported back home to meet home economy 
demands (Cohen, 2007: 69). Many of the emerging economy multinationals involved in 
resource-seeking FDI are state-owned enterprises, illustrating the importance of accounting 
for the institutional environment and needs of the state as the key actor in policy governing 
outward investment flows.   
 
Created / Strategic Asset-Seeking FDI 
Strategic asset-seeking is a specialised and uncommon form of FDI which is often orientated 
toward developed economies, not emerging ones (UNCTAD, 2006: 163). It is FDI that is 
motivated by the acquisition of part or all of a foreign firm to either enhance that firm’s 
competitiveness, by creating greater corporate cohesion or to reduce competition. This form 
of FDI is not motivated by cost reduction or market protection, but rather the acquisition of 
assets.  
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These assets once acquired will strengthen the competiveness of the acquiring firm as well as 
“weakening… competitors” (Cohen, 2007: 71; Dunning, 1993: 60) The acquisition of 
strategic-assets can stifle competition, diversify a firm’s product line, acquire and embed new 
technologies or block a third-party from acquiring those procured assets. Strategic asset-
seeking FDI holds no significant advances or disadvantages for the home or the host 
economy and benefits of this ‘strategy’ will ultimately lie with the acquiring firm who in the 
event of a successful transaction will gain further competitive advantage through the 
procurement of more strategic assets (Cohen, 2007).  
 
2.4 The Firm and the Multinational 
Gilpin (2001: 278) refers to a multinational as the “firm of a particular nationality with 
partially or wholly owned subsidiaries within at least one other national economy.” The 
expansion of a firm beyond its territorial base can occur through M&As, ‘greenfield’ 
investments, takeovers or “intercorporate alliances with firms of other nationalities” (Gilpin, 
2001: 278; Gomes-Casseres, 1996 cited in Gilpin, 2001: 278).  
  
2.4.1 International Business Economists and the Multinational 
Business economists’ contributions to the research and literature on multinationals do not go 
unnoticed and scholars of IPE often refer to these contributions to the field of study on 
foreign direct investment and multinationals.  
 
The most notable contribution to the general explanatory framework on multinationals was 
Dunning (1988; 1993; 2008) (Eden, 1991). Dunning’s liberal eclectic or Ownership, Location 
and Internationalisation (OLI) paradigm or model centres on the decision to invest abroad, 
with emphasis on ownership characteristics and the desirability of the foreign location. The 
paradigm is widely cited not only IPE literature, but across other related fields illustrating the 
dynamism of its relevance (O’Brien and Williams, 2010: 191).  
 
2.4.2 Dunning’s Eclectic Theory: The OLI Paradigm  
A “permissive economic regime” is usually needed in order for firms to internationalise, but 
that is often insufficient (Athreye and Kapur, 2009: 213). Dunning’s eclectic theory or OLI 
theory of the internationalisation of multinationals provides an explanatory framework in 
which it purports that FDI allows firms to exploit firm-specific advantages (Athreye and 
Kapur, 2009: 213).  
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Initially the IB literature employed a macro approach, examining “substitutability of FDI and 
international trade, the effects of FDI on host countries, and the composition and location of 
FDI” (Eden, 1991: 204).  “The OLI paradigm argues that MNEs (multinationals) form and 
grow because they possess three sets of advantages relative to other firms” (Eden, 1991: 204). 
These advantages are ownership, locational and internalisation. The advantages are used in 
conjunction to “explain the existence of multinationals and the reasons for their growth and 
success in certain sectors or countries” (Eden, 1991: 204).   
 
Dunning includes an array of possible benefits of “concrete examples of FDI including (O) 
size, capital, technology, and management advantages; (L) energy, labour, and transportation 
costs; and (I) company attitudes, control needs and the functional nature of production” 
(Pedersen, 2010: 59). What arguably remains largely absent from Dunning’s OLI paradigm is 
the further consideration of the role of government and the influence they may possibly have 
on “each set of company advantages” while Dunning does mention them, it is not considered 
“significant enough to merit further consideration in this framework (Pedersen, 2010: 59). 
Acknowledging the shortcomings has allowed the OLI to be framed in a broader politically 
relevant framework as has been done by Eden (1991) and subsequently this study.  
 
Ownership Advantages  
Multinationals have ownership advantage when they can earn ‘rents’ in a host economy. This 
allows the multinational to succeed in reducing cost disadvantages associated with operating 
and producing in foreign economies (Eden, 1991: 205).These advantages however are often 
intangible and can relate to “knowledge or oligopoly” (Eden, 1991: 205). Knowledge 
advantages include “product and process innovations, marketing and management skills, 
patents and brands (Eden, 1991: 205). Oligopolistic advantages can include “economies of 
scale and scope, and privileged access to various resources” (Eden, 1991: 205).  The 
ownership advantages can be due to one of three foci; firstly the size and the access to 
markets, second, the multinational’s ability to coordinate manufacturing and distribution and 
third, the ability of the multinational to exploit variations between countries (Eden, 1991: 
205).  These key competences are seen as providing potential wide market access.   
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Locational Advantages 
These advantages relate to country-specific advantages and determine which states will 
become host to multinationals (Eden, 1991: 207). Locational advantages can be divided into 
three categories: economic, social and political (Eden, 1991: 207). Economic advantages such 
as labour, capital, management skills, natural resources and technology stem from the host 
economy (Eden, 1991: 207). Markets size and infrastructural capabilities can also aid the host 
state in being more attractive to firms. Social advantages are drawn from the differences that 
exist in culture, language and business ethics (Eden, 1991: 207).  
 
Political advantages can be a definitive gauge to firms of a state’s openness to foreign direct 
investment and foreign firm operations. Factors such as the hosts’ policies on foreign 
investment and trade are crucial and create either a favourable or unfavourable environment 
in which business can be conducted.  
 
Internalisation Advantages 
Internalisation advantages stem from the exploitation of the disparities of “exogenous 
imperfections faced by multinationals” in foreign economies (Eden, 1991: 205). Eden (1991: 
205) notes two types of “exogenous imperfections.”  
 
The first are unique to differing types of markets “from the public good aspect of knowledge, 
from uncertainty and from the existence of transactions costs in all external markets.” The 
second type that Eden (1991:205) notes is “state-generated imperfections such as tariffs, 
foreign exchange controls and subsidies.” Internalisation advantages can also be gained 
through the exploitation of “oligopolistic rivalry among competing multinationals.” “This 
may be because of market possibilities for the output of the foreign ventures ‘market seeking 
FDI’, because the country possesses scarce natural resources ‘resource seeking FDI’, or 
because the country has low operating costs “cost reducing FDI,” which make it an attractive 
export platform” (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2009: 562).  
 
2.5 Application of the Theory  
The theory that frames the analysis of the internationalisation of Indian and Chinese firms in 
Africa is informed by the three academic fields, political economy, IB/IE and IPE.  
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In explanations of the role of government as the primary actor in economics, political 
economy and economic nationalist perspectives are drawn on. In the study of FDI and 
multinationals, literature pertaining to these two is drawn from the work done in IB and IE. 
The choice of including business and economic based theory is pertinent due to attention that 
IB and IE has afforded FDI and multinationals and motivating factors of FDI; which is 
greater than IPE or that of political economy.  
 
In studying the role of the government in the regulation and the process of Indian and 
Chinese firms’ internationalisation, political economy centres the role that the government 
plays in legislative and regulatory frameworks where business is conducted, which impacts 
on the home economies investment paths (Luo et al., 2010: 79). The inclusion of IPE in this 
thesis, drawn from the contributions that Eden (1991) and Strange (1988, 1992) have made to 
the literature on accounting for global economic shifts and the role of multinationals. In terms 
of perspectives from IPE, the study is framed within an economic-nationalist perspective, as 
it is the most fitting perspective to adopt in the study of the outward investments of India and 
Chinese firms. The economic nationalist perspective argues that the expanding presence of 
multinationals in the global economy is not due so much to liberalisation in the global 
economy as it is to governments allowing more capital mobility. In the case of India and 
China the research will illustrate how the policy environment has had a positive effect on 
increasing outward investment flows in the last several years, in comparison to prior eras in 
which the state regulated and controlled OFDI from the home country.   
 
Chapters 4 and 5 begin with an outline of the political economy and the policies that regulate 
outward investments by India and Chinese firms, providing an overview of how these 
policies would eventually define a new era of investment by India and China. The structure of 
the research in the chapters on India and China is further informed by the structure that Deng 
(2003) utilised, describing the core motivations of FDI, using case specific firms to illustrate 
the motivation for FDI in Sub-Saharan host economies. Not all the motivations listed in the 
theory are applied or discussed to either India or Chinese firms, as the UNCTAD (2006) 
notes in their research on motivating factors for FDI, some forms of FDI are more or less 
important to Indian and Chinese firms. Motivations that are clearly applicable to Indo-
African and Sino-African investment are however discussed and examples of such firms that 
have been motivated by such FDI are reviewed.  
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2.6 Conclusion 
The chapter outlined the three contributing fields of inquiry, political economy, International 
business/economics and International Political Economy that create the theoretical 
framework. In Chapters 4 and 5 the theoretical framework will be applied to the study of 
Indian and Chinese OFDI and multinationals. The focus is to review the institutional and 
political economy of Indian and Chinese investments, outlining key investment motivations, 
drivers for internationalisation abroad and the sectoral and entry mode types of multinationals 
in Africa.   
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Chapter 3: Background and Contextualisation: India, China and Africa. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the main developments within contemporary India, China and African 
political and economic relations.  The first part of the chapter covers Africa’s changing 
position in the global economy as a nexus for emerging economy investment. A brief 
discussion on the global financial crisis follows, as it significantly altered FDI flows in the 
world. The latter part of the chapter covers South-South cooperation which is a form of 
cooperation that both India and China have invoked as a framework within which to conduct 
their individual relations with Africa. The final section provides a brief look at some of the 
implications of these contemporary engagements.  
 
3.1.1 Background  
Contemporary relations between African states and India and China are by no means one-
dimensional. The multifaceted nature of Sino – African and Indo – African relations and its 
place in a greater sphere of actors and relations makes this chapter crucial in establishing the 
contemporary nature of the political economy of these actors and relations. Africa is crossing 
new terrain as its international relations and geopolitical orientation in the global economy 
fundamentally change “against the rise of a number of large and influential developing or 
emerging states” (Cornelissen, 2009: 6).  
 
The relative flux and alteration in the international system is according to Cornelissen (2009: 
5) part of two enduring legacies of the Cold War (1946 – 1991) which has seen the “influence 
of economies over politics in determining the trends and tenor of international relations, and 
second, the entities-state, but more so, non-state-which increasing are leaving their imprints 
on the global political landscape… the rapid economic ascendance of some states – and their 
multinational firms – from the South, and the growing influence they appear to have in the 
international system has prompted a justifiable interest among scholars/analysts about their 
implications for the international economy and politics alike.” Governments are primarily 
seen as the drivers of increasing economic interaction in emerging economies with the private 
sector at times only holding a minor, albeit increasing role in assisting these relations 
(Schoeman, 2011: 37). 
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The changing dynamics on the continent and the forging of new partnerships with other 
emerging economies has created “new impulses in Africa’s external relations” (Naidu et al., 
2009: 2). The competitive nature of India and China’s role and their expanding global 
presence is creating alarmist tones in Western discourses on Africa’s new relations. The 
classifying of these new relations falls into two broad understandings of these new strategic 
Indo and Sino-African partnerships. One is a rigid cynical view that posits that Indo-African 
and Sino-African engagements are of an exploitative nature, based on self-interest and 
preservation, driven by addressing pressures in the their home economies . This places Africa 
in another inequitable period of economic disempowerment and political disenfranchisement 
(Naidu et al., 2009: 2).  The second, less cynical approach to these new engagements is that 
these emerging economies could not further threaten an already fragile African 
developmental path. Proponents of increasing South-South interaction and specifically that of 
African – Asian relations suggest a positive outlook on Africa’s development and the 
partnerships that states like India and China are offering the continent (Naidu et al., 2009: 2). 
 
Moeletsi Mbeki (2009) writing on what he terms ‘Africa’s Malaise,’ Mbeki outlines the 
developmental challenges that African economies face, illustrating the vulnerability of 
capitalism, the dangers of donor dependency, donor created democracy, de-industrialisation, 
long term underinvestment and failure of regional integration. The 1980s and the 1990s in 
Africa were a period of immense economic stagnation, continuous humanitarian disasters and 
perpetual conflict that seemed to engulf entire governed regions of the continent. ‘Afro-
pessimism’ became part of the discourse, a term that has come to describe what Martin 
(2008: 339) identifies as “the (pessimistic) commentary on Africa by Northern scholars, 
policy makers and media.”  
 
While Mbeki and other experts’ views on the political economy of Africa may be rather 
strident and bleak, they highlight important facts about Africa’s underdevelopment. Indian 
and Chinese government officials have often publicly stated their intentions that their 
country’s investments seek to address these developmental challenges, not exacerbate them. 
However, Desai (2009) along with Broadman (2007a), while noting the shortcomings of 
Africa’s political economy are swift to magnify and defend the last decade or so of what 
Desai (2009: 414) calls an ‘African Resurgence.’ Africa’s “global focus is an important 
development of the twenty-first century” (Desai, 2009: 414).  
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The commodity boom saw increased investments during the beginning of the millennium 
after what were for many African states decades of ‘post-independence economic stagnation’ 
(Arieff et al., 2010: 5). Africa experienced sound economic growth in the pre – crisis era. 
Growth between 2002 and 2007 was averaging at 6.5 per cent annually. African trade was 
boosted by increasing demands which has largely been due to the exceptional demands of the 
Indian and Chinese economies (AFDB, 2011). “Africa’s top five emerging trade partners are 
now China (38 percent), India (14 per cent), Korea (7.2 per cent), Brazil (7.1 per cent) and 
Turkey (6.5 per cent)” (AFDB, 2011).  
 
3.2 The Global Economy and Crisis 
It began with the bursting of the US housing market bubble and later distended into a global 
financial and economic crisis leading to the most severe global recession since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. Commencing in September 2008 with the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in New York City, “credit flows froze, lender confidence dropped, and economies 
around the world dipped toward recession” (Arieff et al., 2010: 2). “At the beginning of 2009 
it was clear that the global economy was facing a major recession” (Gamble, 2009: 36). 
Having begun in the most industrialised countries in the world, the financial crisis began to 
spread to emerging markets and developing economies, like those of Africa. India and China 
are, alongside perhaps Brazil and the Asian tiger economies perceived to have weathered the 
brunt of the global financial crisis with only slight slowing in gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth (Broadman, 2010: 6).  
 
The recession has affected most African states through an array of mechanisms, “including a 
decline in global trade, a drop in investment, falling remittances from overseas workers, and 
possible cuts in foreign aid. These channels are largely connected to Africa’s “real” economy, 
rather than its financial sector” (Arieff et al., 2010: 7).  Initially, analysts were cautiously 
optimistic that the global financial crisis would not affect Africa like many other regions of 
the world (Arieff et al., 2010: 3). This analysis was based on the premise that African 
economies are some of the least exposed to the global financial system relative to other 
regions. African banks did not have such ‘toxicity’ in their assets, an attribution of the current 
crisis (Arieff et al., 2010: 3). However, as the global financial crisis expanded into a global 
economic recession or slowdown, Africa began to experience the negative effects of global 
economic contraction along with stricter financing conditions abroad as FDI and capital flows 
began to decline (Arieff et al., 2010: 3).  
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Broadman (2010: 6) notes however that despite contraction and the crisis indeed taking a toll 
“Sub – Saharan Africa’s resilient economic performance… has proven to be far more robust” 
than analysts had previously thought. Broadman (2010: 10) speaks of Africa’s “roots of 
resilience.” Similar to other emerging economies, many African states have had varying 
economic growth in the last decade which Broadman (2010) argues is due to African 
policymakers finally laying better suited macroeconomic mechanisms to their economies. 
The global financial crisis may have shrunk or reduced growth in countries across the globe; 
even so, Africa was still able to experience levels of positive growth (BCG, 2010: 1). These 
mixed developments in the global economy brought varied but generally positive signs for 
Africa. Increasing commodity prices, public spending and foreign direct investments in 
extractive sectors, despite total decreases in FDI flows to Africa, increased and supported 
some level of economic recovery (UNECA, 2011: 11). The response of Indian and Chinese 
firms to the global economic crisis was quite different, elaborated on in the following section. 
Indian OFDI declined at the beginning of the crisis whereas China’s OFDI doubled. This is 
argued to be because Chinese OFDI “is crucially determined by political security and 
economic interest of the Chinese state rather than by market forces” (Pradhan, 2011: 143).   
 
3.3 Current Global and Regional FDI Trends  
Global foreign direct investment (FDI) flows increased by 5 per cent, going up to $1.24 
Trillion in 2010, in comparison to the FDI contraction in 2008 and 2009; this figure is still 15 
per cent below the levels of the pre – crisis average. The most discernible disparity is 
between the 2007 FDI flows and contemporary figures with a difference of nearly 37 per cent 
from when global FDI flows peaked in 2007; pre-financial crisis (UNCTAD, 2011: xii). The 
fall in global FDI in the period 2008 – 2009 recorded a 15 per cent contraction. During the 
2008 – 2009 period, the inability of firms to invest as they would have, caused by shortfalls 
in financial resources and access, due internally to marginal corporate profits and externally 
by uncertain economic prospects, especially in the developed world. All major types of FDI, 
market-seeking, efficiency-seeking, and resource-seeking were affected, but some locations 
of these forms of FDI fared better than others. However, despite global downturns of FDI, the 
World Invest Report predicts investment flows to recover and normalise by 2013 at an 
estimated US$1.9 trillion annually, on par with 2007’s figures (UNCTAD, 2011: xii).  
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Figure 1: FDI flows into Africa (2000 - 2010) 
  
      Source: Adapted from (UNCTAD, 2011) 
 
Emerging economies continue to increase their presence as “both recipients and as outward 
investors” (UNCTAD, 2011: xii). While FDI flows to developed countries further contracted 
in 2010, emerging economies came to capture more than 50 per cent of total global FDI 
flows, rising by 12 per cent (UNCTAD, 2011: xii).  This was due in part to quicker recovery, 
the strength of domestic economic demands and amassed South-South flows. The share of 
developing countries in the total flows of FDI to Africa, based on home economy reporting 
was averaging 17.7 per cent in the period 1995 - 1999 (UNCTAD, 81: 2010b). That number 
increased to 20.8 per cent for the period of 2008-2009 (UNCTAD, 81: 2010b).  
 
Industry specific distribution of FDI in Africa was predominantly found in the primary sector 
of which hydrocarbons are the most important totalling 43 per cent, manufacturing accounted 
for 29 per cent and services sector 28 per cent of total incoming FDI (UNCTAD, 2011: 41). 
Angola and Nigeria and were the top recipients of FDI flows in Sub-Saharan Africa, being 
the only states on the continent within the US$3 Billion and above range. They are followed 
by states such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of the Congo and Ghana in the 
US$2.0 billion to US$2.9 billion tier (UNCTAD, 2011: 32). Of these top recipients one 
common denominator emerges and that is the presence of sought after natural resources, 
whether they are hydrocarbons or minerals.  
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
U
S
$
 b
il
li
o
n
 
Year
FDI Inflows into Africa, 2000 - 2010
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
31 
 
While not covered in this study, it is important to note that approximately a third of total FDI 
flows into Africa go to North Africa, a region with large proven oil reserves (UNCTAD, 
2011: 43). The continuing drive for resources and markets, in particular by Asian firms, will 
likely sustain FDI flows to Africa. Concerns over the United States and its debt crisis 
alongside uncertainty and volatility in developed markets and business spheres have kept 
firms cautious, and wary of incurring further risk.  
 
Table 2: FDI Flows into Sub-Saharan Africa (2005-2011)  
Sub-Saharan Africa 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
        
Inflows (US$ bn) 15.2 12.2 13.4 13.9 16.1 17.1 18.1 
% of world total 1.6 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 
% change, year on year  34.3 -19.6 10.3 3.0 16.3 6.3 5.7 
% GDP 2.7 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.0 
    Source: Adapted from (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007) 
  
The increasing lack of faith in global economic governance and overheating or unsustainable 
domestic demand relative to production capacity in some emerging economies, could delay 
FDI recovery (UNCTAD 2011: 2). While much of the Indian and Chinese foreign direct 
investment in Africa is found in the extractive sectors, such as oil and other mining related 
industries investments in telecommunications, commercial real estate, transport, energy and 
construction have increasing shares of total OFDI (Boardman et al., 2007: 2). Between 2004 
and 2008, India recorded an annual OFDI growth rate of 87 per cent while China recorded an 
OFDI growth rate of 81 per cent, far higher than their BRIC partners Russia and Brazil, 68 
per cent and 35 per cent respectively (Hong, 2011: 2). The infrastructural backed deals that 
have garnered so much attention, where Chinese loans are “backed by natural resources 
extracted through FDI projects” continue without signs of slowing (UNCTAD, 2010b: 37).  
With emerging and transitional economies strongly increasing their FDI, 21 per cent, 
accounting for 29 per cent of global FDI flows, Africa despite declining FDI after a booming 
2008, will remain a key investment focus for emerging economies in the years to come 
(UNCTAD, 2011: 40).     
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3.4 South-South Cooperation, India and China.  
3.4.1 South – South Cooperation  
India and China’s economic engagement with African states is often done within the spirit of 
South-South cooperation. South-South alliances are playing a key role in the “economic and 
social development of the region” (UNCTAD, 2010a: 10). Complimentary advantage is the 
governing track of South-South cooperation. Africa needs “external capital, technology and 
technical expertise” while Southern partners need “natural resources, markets and support on 
global issues” (UNCTAD, 2010: 10). Yet South-South cooperation is a concept that is often 
used without proper clarification, instead assuming the reader understands what is being 
inferred. To clarify South-South cooperation, it “refers to the processes, institutions and 
arrangements designed to promote political, economic and technical cooperation among 
developing countries in pursuit of common development goals” (UNCTAD, 2010: 1).   
 
It is multidimensional in scope, encompassing cooperation in areas such as trade, finance, 
investment, as well as the exchange of knowledge, skills and technical expertise between 
developing countries. Pradhan (2008: 9) infers that South-South cooperation is “a broad-
based political and economic consensus” that was established between the countries of the 
developing or ‘South’ during the 1970s to 1980s.  Geographically, it covers bilateral, 
intraregional and interregional cooperation as well as collaboration among developing 
countries on multilateral issues designed to enhance their participation and integration in the 
world economy” (UNCTAD, 2010a: 1). Africa’s relations with the encompassing ‘global 
South,’ or simply ‘South,’ can be found in the formal involvement of African and Asians 
states; most of whom had recently acquired independence and those still seeking it like most 
of the African states. These states held a conference in Bandung, Indonesia from April 18th 
to the 24th, 1955. The conference sought to establish Afro – Asian links with the aim of 
economic, political and cultural cooperation as well as stand against colonialism. At this 
point in time Afro – Asian links were predominantly of a political nature.  
 
However as time passed through the decades, crises after crises these links would soon 
transcend politics and begin to involve military support to various armed groups involved in 
the struggles for political dominance, a case of Cold War proxies. In contemporary times, the 
state of Afro – Asian relations have become far more economical in nature as African states 
come to view the South as “a mechanism for enhancing growth, reducing poverty and 
integrating into the global economy” (UNCTAD, 2010a: 1).   
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To Africa, South-South Cooperation is an alternative to that which has over the course of the 
last sixty or so years been offered by the West chiefly when it comes to mechanism of aid and 
loans, which states like China provide to African states with little or no ‘conditionality 
clauses.’ International Monetary Fund and World Bank structural adjustment polices (SAPs) 
which were offered to developing nations with conditionality clauses were widely criticised 
for being more detrimental than beneficial to African economies. Africa’s interactions with 
the South generally are of three cooperation forms.  
 
The first form of these cooperation forms is bilateral; which is cooperation between African 
state and a developing state from another region. Such bilateral partnerships can be seen in 
those between African states or a single state and either India or China. The second of the 
cooperation forms is trilateral; that being an African state and a developing state from 
another respective region. The most prominent of the trilateral cooperation bodies is the 
IBSA partnership or India, Brazil and South Africa. The third of the cooperation forms is 
inter-regional; which is between Africa and other developing regions of the world. Such 
inter-regional bodies include The Asian–African Strategic Partnership, the Africa-South 
America Initiative and the Afro-Arab Cooperation Initiative (UNCTAD, 2010a: 12-
13).Within the international system, South-South cooperation and the reliance on large states 
such as India and China, who too seek reform, not just in the structure of the United Nations 
Security Council of which China is a permanent member, but in the global discourses that 
take place on a regular basis with regards to security, environmentalism, finance and the 
world economy. The very discourses which Africa often feels neglected from and unable to 
“influence the agenda, pace and decisions” made within these discourses. To Africa, these 
growing interactions with the South extend beyond historical ties and centres on the 
continent’s desire to find partners in development. These partners could aid Africa “revitalise 
the continent’s frail developmental project…within the context of increased trade and 
investment linkages and new forms of development assistance” (Naidu et al., 2009: 2).  
 
South-South cooperation and the symbolism of the reciprocal nature of these relations are 
seen as cornerstones to India and China’s strengthening involvement in the continent. It 
forms part of the broader strategy of the two countries to differentiate themselves from 
Africa’s traditional Western trading, aid and investment partners.     
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3.4.2 Indo-African Relations 
India has had strong ties and relations with Africa for several decades. India is gearing up to 
globalise a lot of its efforts and to play a more key role in the future of the world. Through 
the engagement of regional trade agreements, strengthening bilateral relations and its 
activism in previous and contemporary political associations in Africa, the country is set to 
play to the shifting geographies of power (Mawdsley and McCann, 2010: 89). This has been 
seen by some scholars like Mawdsley and McCann (2010: 468) as a largely unreported part 
of India’s developing contemporary African engagement noting “that there is now a more 
pronounced realpolitik to India’s Africa endeavours.” Liberalisation policies in India in the 
1990s, while generally considered being mainly concerned on opening up the economy, 
created complimentary political considerations too. 
 
The ambitious Indian private sector and its entities, spent years waiting for more liberal 
reforms in the economy, began to see great opportunities abroad. It was only in 2008 that 
India made a leap in creating a “new architecture for its engagement with Africa” with the 
inaugural India-Africa Summit in New Delhi (UNCTAD, 2010a: 16). The summit will now 
be held every three years with the attendance level being rather high with heads of state and 
government as attendees. In the 2008 India-Africa Summit, firm commitments to cooperation 
in economics, politics, research and development, social development and capacity building, 
along with energy and infrastructure, were some of the key talking points. At the 2011 India-
Africa Summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, energy, investment and diplomatic relations topped 
the agenda, reflecting the evolution of India’s interactions with Africa as it steers its policy 
towards a firmer political and resource and investment orientated engagement  (Tao and 
Shanggang, 2011).  
 
Over the course of the last twenty years the Indian government began to develop and nurture 
a more expansive and guided foreign agenda. This agenda can be seen in the notable regional 
and international cooperative bodies within Africa, from the Techno – Economic Approach 
for Africa-India Movement (TEAM 9), to the Focus Africa and the Indian Technical and 
Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme (Mawdsley and McCann, 2010: 84, 87).  It was 
not until recently that India established a platform for cooperation in the region. The first 
India – African Forum summit was held in New Delhi in April 2008. 
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The Forum is guided by the idea of reciprocity, social development, energy and environment 
amongst other interests and is held at the head of government and state level. India is active 
in supplying developmental loans, debt relief, technical assistance, academic scholarships and 
programmes abroad as well as peacekeeping (UNCTAD, 2010a: 17). Africa is “strategically 
and geopolitically important to India” as the Eastern African seaboard from the Horn of 
Africa to the coasts of South Africa fall within “India’s maritime strategic neighbourhood” 
(Desai, 2009: 413).Similar to China, India’s reliance and access to these resources in Africa 
is similar, as are African markets’ demand for Indian manufactured goods. The nomination of 
India as a dialogue partner to the African Union is seen as recognition by African states of the 
role India plays in the economic development of the continent (Desai, 2009: 418). India is 
also a regular contributor of troops to United Nations peacekeeping missions in Africa, a 
commitment by New Delhi to support security related and global multilateral efforts 
(Mawdsley and McCann, 2010: 89).  
 
Economic Interests and Engagements  
The Focus Africa programme was established as part of an Indian EXIM bank driven policy 
that encouraged Indian bilateral trade and investment in Africa. The programme was targeted 
at sub-Saharan Africa, primarily Nigeria, South Africa, Mauritius, Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania 
and Ghana. The policy now covers all of Africa. The Indian EXIM Bank has extended lines 
of credit to some of Africa’s regional blocs such as the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA)and the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) (Cheru and Obi, 
2011: 100). The TEAM-9 Initiative, launched in 2004 was created in the hopes of broadening 
relations with energy and resource endowed West African states which India had largely 
neglected diplomatically and foreign policy wise over the last few decades (Desai, 2009: 
422). TEAM-9 Initiative  includes various levels, governmental, institutional and the private 
sector involved in sharing expertise such as “intellectual and physical resources” including 
social programmes, “education and training in crucial sectors” technology transfers, and 
specific projects in small-scale industry, pharmaceuticals, information technology (IT), 
telecommunication, energy and transportation (Desai, 2009: 422; Mawdsley and McCann, 
2010: 84). India will draw on its expertise in these fields, since many of these sectors have 
Indian firms that have internationalised into Africa, to support access to markets and 
resources in West Africa.  
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3.4.3 China 
Historical Background 
In the formative years of the People’s Republic, China from independence to its economic 
opening in 1978 was primarily ideologically driven. Focusing on politics, the China’s policy 
supported independence movements and creating relations with African governments. By 
1978, China had diplomatic relations with 43 African countries. In the early 1990s, China and 
Africa’s relationship evolved from being primarily on “ministry-sponsored development aid” 
towards a market orientated approach focusing on bilateral trade and OFDI (Yin and 
Vaschetto, 2011: 45).  
 
Political Interests  
China is strengthening its presence in Africa through bilateral and multilateral forums like the 
Asia-Africa summit, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), China-Africa 
Business Council and possibly in a new commission with India and Africa (Cheru and Obi, 
2011: 90). China’s interests in Africa are however not purely economic.  Contemporary Sino-
African relations also contain important diplomatic and political considerations (Gill and 
Reilly, 2007: 37). History continues to play an important part of China’s African relations 
which has been rooted in 55 years of supportive and respective support for African states 
(Gill and Reilly, 2007: 37).  
 
In 2006 the leading paper on Sino – African relations entitled China’s Africa Policy was 
released. Outlined in six key sections the document establishes the precedents that guide 
Chinese policy in Africa. These precedents include strengthening strategic partnerships, 
enhancing political equality, economic cooperation and cultural exchange.  
 
Economic Interests 
Resource security is one of the most invoked reasons scholars and the media have suggested 
when exploring Chinese economic interests in Africa. The securing of resources is very much 
a strategic concern, especially oil. As Corkin (2007: 317) suggests; “unsurprisingly all of 
China’s oil companies are state-owned.” Resources are one of China’s key motivations for 
expanding its engagements on the continent. Africa has an abundance of natural resources 
and increasing oil output on the continent has led China to make massive investments in 
hydrocarbons over the years.  
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The demand for oil can be quite well established by the close ties that have developed 
between China and resource rich states like Angola, Nigeria and Sudan (Cheng and Shi, 
2009: 103). The Chinese government promotes business opportunities in Africa by providing 
its “corporations with information, coordination mechanisms and financial assistance to 
Chinese companies” (Gill and Reilly 2007: 39). China, employs an array of economic 
mechanisms to capture resources on the continent through “financial assistance, prestige 
construction projects and arms sales to cement ties with these oil-producing states” (Alden, 
2005:148). China’s economic interests are not solely focused on resources. There have been 
substantial investments and projects in mining, construction telecommunications and 
agriculture. Large infrastructural backed deals, which will be touched on later, have seen 
many Chinese firms “involved in road and railway rehabilitation” (Corkin, 2007: 316). 
Telecommunications companies like ZTE and Huawei are actively involved on the continent 
having signed deals in Nigeria and Angola as they seek out new markets (Corkin, 2007: 315). 
Africa is a particularly good economy for marketing low-cost consumer goods where 
consumer power is largely weak.    
 
3.4.4 India and China: Differing Engagements  
India and China were welcomed to Africa amidst a shift in the economic power of the world. 
India and China may be big economic players in Africa and the globe, but that does not mean 
that either their foreign policy or broader economic and fiscal policies; and their expanding 
influence regionally and globally, or on continents such as Africa is a homogenous one. Both 
India and China represent themselves to Africa as partners in South-South solidarity and 
strengthen this partnership by continually invoking historical ties and a common goal of 
transforming the international order into one which is economically more equitable. India and 
China may be drivers of change in the global economy, but the two engage it quite 
differently. 
 
The contemporary economic activity of these two states in Africa is exceptional and 
overshadows former prominent Asian powers on the continent, South Korea and Japan 
(Boardman, 2008: 95). New Delhi and Beijing are actively involved in the process of 
developing public programmes of trade and investment finance to provide the necessary 
means for its firms to expand into foreign markets. While such government intervention is 
usually associated with China, New Delhi continues to create mechanisms geared at 
promoting and facilitating outward investment.    
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Whether such actions are done so as to drop the veil over a nefarious new age ‘scramble for 
Africa’ is not the subject of this study, but what is of importance and substance is how these 
differing engagements impact and mould the role of India and China’s business interests on 
the continent. The histories and processes that have led India and China up to this point in the 
‘contemporary’ engagement with Africa are of course the product of a lengthy historical 
interaction.  Beyond the speculation within the literature on India and Chinese African 
interactions lie subtle variances and not so subtle engagements that require more attention, 
such as political systems, economic and fiscal policy, cultural and business practices 
(Broadman, 2008: 95). The ownership of Indian and Chinese firms is one such factor. 
Chinese firms that have internationalised tend to be, up to two-thirds, state-owned or state-
controlled. The remainder of the firms are of mixed-ownership, state and a fraction being 
privately owned (Pal, 2010: 266). Indian firms are predominantly run or owned by “private 
investors, strategic investors, and the general public” (Pal, 2010: 266).  
 
While India does boast competitive SOEs, the ownership structure of many of India’s firms 
according to Sáez and Chang (2009: 276) can be misleading. While Indian firms that have 
internationalised are mainly private, India’s “state sector involvement” in private firms can be 
indirect, mainly through state financial institutions that provide support for Indian firms, such 
as the Unit Trust of India, Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India (ICICI) or 
the Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) (Sáez and Chang, 2009: 276).  
 
State policies by the Chinese government have been more accommodating, more 
diplomatically supported, equating to more a multi-faceted push for its firms to 
internationalise (Pal, 2010: 266). Thus the internationalisation of Chinese firms has been top-
down, their investment objectives being reflected by Beijing’s political objectives (Hong, 
2011: 21). Despite India’s global economic standing it, along with many other comparable 
states like Russia, Brazil, South Africa for instance lack instrumental tools, such as strong 
finance, that the Chinese government holds (Pal, 2010: 267). Indian and Chinese firms 
perceive commercial risks differently, which in turn influences their business strategies 
(Broadman, 2009: 95).  
 
India and China differ when it comes to sectoral distribution of their outward investments. 
Non-financial services and primary sectors like mining accounted for large a percentage of 
Chinese investments.  
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It is in the energy sector that China has made its mark in Africa and where the government 
has shown the most amounts of support and interest in aiding (Corkin, 2007: 315). Non-
financial sectors include business services, wholesale and retail, transportation, storage and 
related logistical services and building and real estate. Manufacturing only captured a small 
percentage of total Chinese investments (Hong, 2011: 17). India’s sectoral distribution 
however sees manufacturing as its major sector. Similar to China, India’s second largest 
investment sector is in agriculture and mining activities followed by non-financial services 
(Hong, 2011: 19). What can be deduced from the literature currently available on Asian 
investment expansion in Africa is that the surge of FDI from emerging economies can be 
attributed to the aforementioned change in global economic and political dynamics. It is also 
attributed to government policy; the government encourages local firms to ‘go global,’ 
shaped by home institutional factors that through necessity, set “the trajectory of emerging 
market enterprises” (Luo et al., 2010: 68).  
 
The rise of companies from emerging economies are not only new or increasingly 
competitive entities, but also ones that are backed by increasingly powerful states, such as 
those of India and China (BCG, 2011: 6). Established and well-known brands like Jaguar and 
Land Rover are now owned by the Tata Group, an Indian multinational. Huawei 
Technologies and ZTE, from China are the second and fifth largest companies in mobile 
telecommunications. Such businesses are capturing markets across Africa as they grow 
(BCG, 2011: 6).  
 
3.4.5 The Implications of the Emerging Presence of South Multinationals in Africa 
With any new form of international engagement there will be advantages and disadvantages. 
According to Collier (2007) most African states’ development and growth are hindered by 
four traps. These traps are exacerbated in the poorer of the African states, but apply to more 
developed ones too, the four traps are: the conflict trap, the natural resources trap, bad 
neighbours and poor governance. These four traps can lead to a further three traps, namely 
the trade trap, the investment trap and the self-confidence trap (Pal, 2010: 268). What all 
these traps essentially culminate in is the inability of many African states to effectively do 
business let alone run efficient governments and stable environments. Conflict disrupts 
political economic activities, rule of law and governance.  
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China, through infrastructural backed type deals have at least attempted to provide poor, 
resource rich countries with preferential access to developmental projects that probably 
would not have come to fruition without the help of Chinese skills and financing.  
 
Resources lead to a ‘curse’ whereby “resource rents make democracy malfunction” (Collier, 
2007: 42). What Pal (2010) and Collier (2007) are illustrating is that general instability, the 
presence of resources and poor governance causes increasing risk to investors. Investors that 
are willing to mitigate the risk or engage in African states regardless, find themselves in 
tougher bargaining positions with the home economies and multinationals resulting in 
“suboptimal outcomes for the host country” (Pal, 2010: 268).While much of what Collier 
says is well known about investing in Africa, nonetheless this arguably cannot be employed 
that effectively as the dynamics are changing, in the context of emerging economies and their 
interactions with the continent. Southern investors, unlike their Western or Northern 
counterparts not only create more employment but are also better suited for the environment 
in which such economic activities take place.  
 
African states find themselves in better bargaining positions with Southern multinationals. 
Indian and Chinese investors and the home governments have created expansive reforms to 
the relations in which these economic activities take place; they are founded on good will and 
reciprocity (Pal, 2010: 268-269). Broadman (2007a) suggests the engagement is beneficial 
going further to suggest that India and China, due to their active role in aid and investment on 
the continent, can be credited for Africa’s weathering of the global financial crisis (Pal, 2010: 
269).  
 
Indian and Chinese firms are “…helping African countries move up on the production chain, 
this is enabling African countries to participate in the global trade networks that had 
previously been difficult for their domestic firms to access” (Pal, 2010: 269-270). Knowledge 
spillovers from Indian and Chinese multinationals to African firms are evident and will 
possibly provide many significant advantages to Africa’s industrialisation (Broadman, 2007, 
2010; Pal, 2010: 270).  Pham (2010) suggests that Africa should continue to strengthen its 
position in the global economy through the increased level of attention it has received; in aid, 
trade, and investment. Historically, African leaders have not embraced FDI as a crucial 
feature of economic development. 
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African leaders have been wary of the possibility of the political and economic implications 
that investing firms’ can have on the domestic economy. Highly competitive foreign 
multinationals are often seen not to contribute to long term economic and development 
growth in countries, instead becoming competitors to local firms and exacerbating socio-
economic challenges. Dupasqueir and Osakwe (2006: 258) concur with Pham and 
furthermore add that provided host economies in Africa continue to endorse FDI and create 
and sustain stable investment environments, African economies can capture the promised 
potential benefits.       
 
3.5 Conclusion 
The role of Indian and Chinese multinationals in Africa does pose challenges but it also has 
prospects for the continent. India and China record exceptional economic growth and global 
economic clout, the global financial crises created a recession that retarded global FDI. 
India’s FDI took a far greater knock than China’s but investment flows are slowly starting to 
gain traction.  
 
The continent, aware of its growing importance in the global economy, will need to 
continually work on “continental, political and economic capacities in order to better manage 
relations with emerging and traditional powers” (Kornegay and Landsberg, 2009: 190). At 
this stage of the engagement between India, China and African states it is too early to draw 
conclusions as to whether or not this is “a new dimension of South-South relations” (Cheru 
and Obi, 2011: 106). There are a lot of moving parts in India and China’s engagements with 
Africa. In the last decade several leaps have been made by these states in their outward 
investments and soft-power projections in Africa (Cheru and Obi, 2011: 104). The long term 
implications of the strengthening of political and economic ties and the internationalisation of 
Indian and Chinese firms on the continent cannot be fully accounted for at this point.  
 
While China has a policy for Africa, India does not and is still in the process of developing a 
‘total’ strategy for the continent. What can be said at this point though is that India and 
China’s growing engagement in Africa is without a doubt transforming Africa’s political 
economy. In their own capacities India and China and their investment motivations in Africa 
will impact the host economy. The next two chapters detail these investments and the 
institutional environments that have aided these investments to flow into Africa.   
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Chapter 4: Indian Outward Foreign Direct Investment and Multinationals 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The chapter presents a macro analysis of Indian multinationals and OFDI in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, expanding on their sectoral orientation, current FDI figures, characteristics and the 
role of the Indian government in “influencing the process of outward expansion of local 
capital in the form of OFDI” (Pedersen, 2010: 62). The chapter establishes that the 2nd wave 
of investments (1995 -) abroad were linked to the liberalisation of the Indian domestic 
economy and primarily market-seeking but have become increasingly resource-seeking as 
India struggles to meet its economy’s energy requirements. 
 
4.2 Background 
India is the fourth largest economy in the world by purchasing power parity terms with a 
GDP that sits over US$4 trillion; with  GDP growth expected to be over eight per cent in 
2010/2011 (World Bank, 2010; Cambell, 2011).  Rapid and sustained economic growth is 
attributed to a competitive Indian economy, having implemented economic reforms in 1991, 
which was seen as a response to a fiscal and a balance of payments crisis (Cambell, 2011). 
Most of the expansion into Africa by India is led by the private the sector although the 
presence of state firms is increasing, as Indian SOEs are motivated to emulate their private-
sector and Chinese SOEs counterparts by seeking opportunities in Africa (Cambell, 2011). 
Africa’s share of Indian FDI was US$243 million in 2000, to US$2.4 billion in 2008. India’s 
FDI is mostly driven by the private sector, the exceptions being a few large SOEs in the 
energy sector, as such Indian OFDI has largely driven by growth, competition and business 
opportunities (Pradhan, 2010b: 77).  
   
Indian firms are investing on a larger scale in Africa than in the first wave of investment, 
which took place from the initial investment at the end of the 1950s to 1995, when the 
lessening of the regulatory investment regime began, resulting in a the second wave of 
investments. Investing billions of dollars to “tap the potential of its growing market and 
increasing its footprint across the continent” (Pasricha, 2011). Partly in response to the 
increasing presence of competitor firms from China and other emerging economies; but also 
the motivation to seek out new markets.  
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While investors in the continent recognise the growing markets of Africa, they also are 
mindful of the large disparities between the opportunities offered in different regions and 
countries. However many Indian firms believe that notwithstanding such vast differences lie 
macro trends within the African economy that cannot be ignored (Pasricha, 2011).In the last 
five years, Indian firms have either acquired or invested approximately US$16 billion in 
several businesses and industries in Africa (Pasricha, 2011). The thrust into Africa by old and 
new Indian firms alike is similar to China, as Indian firms become increasingly backed by a 
more pragmatic and financially accommodating New Delhi, pledging large investment and 
trade in the immediate future to Africa (Pasricha, 2011).  
 
While state-owned firms make large investments in hydrocarbons, the Indian private sector, 
of which many Indian firms in Africa are, boast industry specific advantages, such as those 
firms involved in pharmaceuticals, electrical power, automobiles, information technology, 
mineral extraction and consumer goods continue to tap the markets in Africa. While the 
Indian economy is growing, corruption and increasingly tougher rates on borrowing are 
prompting firms to exploit firm advantages and raise capital beyond the Indian domestic 
economy (Lamont, 2011).The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) estimated that total OFDI by 
Indian firms reached almost US$44 billion in the 2010/2011 fiscal year, compared to the 
substantially smaller US$18 billion in the 2009/2010 fiscal year (Lamont, 2011). In the 
2007/2008 fiscal year outward investment stood at US$21 billion. The decline in the 2009 
investment figures, and general decline in global FDI, was largely due to the global economic 
downturn.  India’s interests in Africa share many similarities with those of its greater 
comparative state, China and India has responded, interacting with African states and markets 
in new strategic and economic ways. While Indo-African relations are founded in long 
historical interactions, new attempts at strengthening these relations are indicative of a new 
era of Indian relations and international power. The Indian presence on the continent may be 
rather inconspicuous next to China, but it’s certainly no less important. From 
telecommunications, automobiles, to hydrocarbons and mining, Indian firms invest in most of 
the major economic sectors in Africa (Afrique Avenir, 2011; Sparks, 2011: 72).  
 
4.2.1 India’s Liberalisation and Outward Investments 
“Indian firms expanded outward in two waves, the first occurring in the 1970s and 1980s, and 
the second occurring after 1995, shortly after India had opened up to the global economy in 
1991 following economic reforms.  
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The second wave was not only bigger in terms of the scale and speed of outward FDI, but the 
firms involved used a broader range of strategies” (Ramamurti and Singh, 2009: 110).India’s 
investments in Africa are interesting because it was the first wave of investment, not so much 
the second that India invested in developing economies. The first Indian firm to 
internationalise, the Birla Group, established their first plant, a textile mill in Ethiopia in 
1959. In the following year, Birla would expand into Kenya, establishing an engineering firm 
in Kenya (Athukorala, 2009: 130).  
 
India’s liberalisation process of the early 1990s was a significant watershed for the domestic 
economy and provided strong motivation for India’s firms to expand into other markets. India 
currently has eight companies in the Fortune Global 500 listing, which ranks the world’s 
largest corporations by revenue. In descending order on the list these firms are Indian Oil 
Corporation Ltd (98), Reliance Industries Limited (134), Bharat Petroleum Corporation 
Limited (272), State Bank of India (292), Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (336), 
Tata Motors Limited (359), Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (361) and Tata Steel (370) 
(CNNMoney, 2011). While not far behind, India placed third behind United Arab Emirates 
and Egypt as having the highest OFDI growth between 2000 – 2008 (Pattanaik and Bhargavi, 
2001: 5). Between 2000 and 2009, 38 Indian multinationals completed a total of 52 mergers 
and acquisitions in Africa amounting to almost US$3 billion (Pal, 2010: 255). 
 
The second wave of foreign investment by Indian firms began in the mid-1990s which gained 
traction well into the 2000s as restrictions on capital flows for foreign acquisitions liberalised 
(Athukorala, 2009: 130).   A bulk of India’s initial investments abroad, in the first wave were 
in developing regions of the world, Africa and Asia. While this has not changed as Indian 
investments continue to increase in Africa, more contemporary flows of Indian OFDI have 
been directed at more developed regions of the world (Hattari and Rajan, 2010: 503). Prior to 
the liberalisation of the Indian economy, FDI flows to Africa from India were minuscule at 
best. Indian firms began to invest abroad since independence but in amounts barely 
measurable. It was only twenty years later that New Delhi began to create policy on outward 
investment flows (Pedersen, 2010: 63). Between 1961 and 1989, Indian firms made total 
investments of a paltry US$79 million into African host economies. 
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The investment drive of India into Africa has undergone a structural change in this decade. 
Previously, once relatively small to medium sized firms engaging in OFDI flows are now 
being overshadowed by much larger and ambitious Indian firms with significant investments 
in extractive industries in African states (Pederson, 2010: 257).  Big-ticket mergers and 
acquisitions deals like Bharti Airtel’s US$10.7 billion acquisition of Kuwait’s Zain’s Sub-
Saharan operations make India one of the largest investors in Africa and the 21st largest 
outward investor in the global economy (Chandra-Mohan, 2010; Pattanaik and Bhargavi, 
2011: 5).  
 
4.3 The Political Economy of Indian OFDI and Multinationals  
The Guidelines for Indian Joint Ventures and Wholly Owned Subsidiaries Abroad were 
amended in 1992, 1999 and 2002 which granted automatic approval for OFDI proposals; 
increasing from US$2 million in 1992 up to US$100 million by 2002, a remarkable 500 
percent increase in ten years (Kumar, 2007: 3). Policy and legislation governing outbound 
investment from India are attributed to the “rapid growth in FDI flows from India that began 
in 2000, and the boom in foreign acquisitions by Indian firms that began from around 2005 
(Nayyar, 2008: 125). The ceiling rate of investments abroad were eventually scrapped in 
2004, automatically allowing Indian firms to invest up to 100 per cent of their net worth, 
(Kumar, 2007: 3). The policy regime and its significant changes made Indian firms’ 
internationalisation possible through access to financial markets (Nayyar, 2008: 125). 
Political considerations, in the home and host economy of transnational production have and 
remain important variables. The scrutiny of politics however has often fallen in the host 
economy. Risk of appropriation, conflict, corruption and so on that can undermine a firm’s 
expansion.  
 
The following section provides an overview of India’s OFDI and the role government in 
outward investments. Having understood what FDI entails and what one understands of 
political economy, government interventions in the economy, especially those of the 
emerging economies need to be better clarified as such characteristics and practices are 
indicative of a broader government consensus on policy. During the era in which these 
forthcoming policies found their roots, Indian multinationals had been investing in a very 
limited capacity from the late 1950s. It was only in the 1970s that the Indian government 
began to formulate policies that would guide the outward investments.  
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Initially these policies were rather restrictive and conservative. Indian expansion abroad 
would be limited to joint-ventures as minority partners (Pedersen, 2010: 63). Pederson 
(2010), writing on the role of the Indian government in promoting OFDI, notes four key ways 
in which the Indian government has accomplished this; creating a supportive environment 
and institutional facilities,  shaping the domestic development of ownership advantages, 
direct regulation and direct regulation in OFDI.  
 
4.3.1 Creating a Supportive Environment  
Since its independence India has retained friendly diplomatic relations with many of the 
countries in the world. India’s role in the Non-Aligned Movement and its ardent support for 
South-South cooperation, aid support and role in United Nations peacekeeping operations 
indeed create an atmosphere of good will that allowed Indian multinationals to 
internationalise with confidence in many host economies and furthermore allowed these 
multinationals and other interests in Africa to go largely unscrutinised, especially in 
comparison to those of China. But its diplomacy has been strained by grave domestic 
challenges; tense regional relations with Pakistan and China, and a history of avoiding taking 
sides in international disputes (Economist, 2011). India’s diplomatic presence in the world 
and Africa remains modest next to China. China is represented in almost every African state, 
a level of representation that India can at this point only strive to have but India is aware of 
its diplomatic shortfalls in such areas knowing full the importance it will play when it comes 
to creating a supportive environment for its businesses in Africa. The expansion and 
enlargement of India’s state-owned banking institutions is well placed to play a greater role in 
providing many of the privately owned firms from India the means to overcome the shortages 
they have faced when attempting to access financing for prospective investments.  
 
4.3.2 Shaping the Domestic Development of Ownership Advantages  
New Delhi’s domestic industrial policies have been instrumental in the “creation of 
capabilities…and…characteristics of Indian multinationals” which were gained in the last 
several years (Pedersen, 2010: 65). New Delhi’s policies relating to investments in higher 
education and research and development (R&D) have facilitated the technological and 
managerial skills that one sees today in Indian firms (Nayyar, 2008: 126; Pedersen, 2010: 
64). Some Indian firms possess diverse companies and activities in many industries like the 
Tata Group. Such firms are often seen to have internationalised due to some of the mentioned 
restrictive policies in their home economy.  
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Pedersen (2010: 66) argues that the Indian policies on investing, pre-liberalisation, indirectly 
prompted companies to exploit their advantages and internationalise. Relative to the domestic 
economy and its development, the number of sizable Indian firms that engaged in OFDI has 
expanded largely at the time of what were new industries; this is the case for India’s 
information technology firms, like Infosys.   
  
4.3.3 Direct Regulation 
Crucial political influence in the investment flows of firms can be seen by New Delhi’s 
policies focused on approving “individual OFDI projects” (Pedersen, 2010: 66). While the 
previous mentioned government involvement in OFDI facilitated and encouraged Indian 
firms capable of internationalisation to invest abroad. Policy guidelines regarding approval of 
OFDI had been in place since 1970 and before the 1990s, all investment projects were subject 
to governmental approval. Policies restricting OFDI, while motivated in the interest of the 
home economy, were also subject to balance of payments and foreign exchange reserves and 
rates. When the balance of payments were perceived to be worsening, OFDI approval was 
more restrictive, as it was deemed that less foreign exchange was available for investments 
abroad.  
 
4.3.4 Direct Participation in OFDI 
Hindustan Machine Tools is considered to be India’s first SOE to internationalise when the 
firm was greenlit to expand into Kenya with the establishment of a machine tool project in 
1978. Hindustan would later expand into Nigeria in a similar effort. By 1982, only four SOEs 
were involved in on-going investments, accounting for only three per cent of total Indian 
OFDI. A few years into liberalisation of the Indian economy, very few SOEs were actually 
multinational. Overseas investment remained small, but one project in particular, a fertilizer 
and phosphoric acid plant in Senegal set up in 1984 illustrated that government investment 
decisions were positive to overall levels of OFDI (Pedersen, 2010: 68).  In the beginning of 
the 2000s, New Delhi’s outlook on SOEs began to evolve to what one is witnessing now, a 
more fervent push by the state to motivate large hydrocarbon firms such as Gas Authority 
India Ltd (GAIL), Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) and Oil India to internationalise 
into other developing regions of the world like Russia, Central Asia and Africa (Pedersen, 
2010: 68). 
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4.3.5 Role of the State in Outward Investments  
Strong regulation governing industry and corporate activities of outward investments either 
directly or indirectly prompted possibly even coerced Indian firms to internationalise. The 
most direct of these influences is noted to have been seen in the role of OFDI and private 
firms when it came to the processes of granting them investments abroad which was relative 
to foreign exchange in the state. While Dunning (1993, 2008) notes that advantages are 
necessary for firms to internationalise, in the 1970s, during the policy flurry that would 
regulate investments abroad, Indian firms were capable to invest abroad and compete 
globally, but were restrained by New Delhi and its concerns of balance of payments and the 
domestic economy at large.  The rise in Indian multinationals abroad and levels of OFDI 
“imperfectly reflects the growing capabilities of Indian multinationals… it also reflects the 
more comfortable foreign exchange situation and the consequent easing of investment 
restrictions… evident for the latest rise in investments, after the almost complete removal of 
the remaining OFDI restrictions in 2003” (Pedersen, 2010: 69).  
 
4.4 Determinants, Drivers and Motivations of Outward Investments by Indian Firms 
The internationalisation of India’s firms was historically conducted through greenfield 
investments, prior to the liberalisation of the economy in the early 1990s. In the later or 
second wave of OFDI, M&As would become the prominent method of entry into new 
economies (Buckley et al., 2009).  Institutional factors and their role in driving firms abroad 
are widely studied in IB. In a broad understanding, institutional factors either create or reduce 
barriers. Firms tailor their strategies relative to institutional frameworks.  This can be seen in 
by the thrust of Indian firms abroad following liberalising policies such as in 2007 when the 
overseas investment limit was 400 per cent of net worth per annum, this limit coincided with 
the largest reported acquisitions by Indian firms to the value of US$18.8 billion (Buckley et 
al.,  2009).  
 
Key motivations for Indian firms in their overseas acquisition drives have been to capture 
new markets and to “sustain top-line growth to strengthen business value propositions” 
(Bakunina, 2008: 42). The motivations of Indian firm internationalisation are quite diverse 
and include market, efficiency, resource and technology seeking driven OFDI. Of course 
these motivations vary between regions, sectors and firms but are general motivators for 
Indian firms regardless.  
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Indian multinationals’ competitive advantages have of the years been defined by their 
technological and skill intensity, which one can see in their information technology and 
pharmaceutical firms (Tolentino, 2010: 103).   
 
4.4.1 FDI Motivations  
Resource Seeking 
Until recently, India had failed to formulate a strategic energy security policy. It was only in 
2005 that New Delhi began the creation of the Energy Co-Ordination Committee. The 
objective of the committee was to “enable a systematic approach to policy formulation, 
promote co-ordination in inter-departmental action and function as a key mechanism for 
providing institutional support to decision-making in the area of energy planning and 
security” (Dadwal, 2011: 6). In 2006, the committee published its final report, the Integrated 
Energy Report, which has since release been the cornerstone of India’s energy security policy 
(Dadwal, 2011: 6).  
 
One of the policy recommendations is the “encouraging of Indian state-owned and private 
energy companies to acquire assets, through the purchase of equity in oil, gas and coal blocks 
or stakes in exploration and production (E&P) companies abroad” (Dadwal, 2011: 8).  The 
policy is guided by the position that “India’s energy security, at its broadest level, is primarily 
about  ensuring  the continuous availability of commercial energy at competitive prices to 
support its economic growth and meet the lifeline energy needs of its households with safe, 
clean and convenient forms of energy, even if that entails directed subsidies” (IEP Report, 
2006: xxiv). India is currently the third largest energy consumer in the world after the United 
States and China (Enerdata, 2010). Africa currently supplies 20 per cent of India’s oil (Pham, 
2007: 344).  India and China have similar strategies when it comes to resource capture in 
Africa, although China has often outbid India and at times simply through aggressive 
lobbying won over contracts. The internationalisation of India’s SOEs in oil and gas are 
vertically integrated, similar to Western firms (Ramamurti and Singh, 2008: 124). As late-
movers, Indian firms struggled to internationalise at first, as investment opportunities in the 
resource sector can be difficult to acquire in the face of increasing global demand and 
competition from rival emerging economy multinationals. In the wake of disinvestment in 
Sudan by Western firms, the country became an attractive investment opportunity for 
hydrocarbon firms from India and China who were not barred from investing in the country 
(Ramamurti and Singh, 2008: 124).  
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Videocon Industries, a publicly traded Indian conglomerate involved in several industries, is 
one of only a handful of private Indian firms involved in the hydrocarbons sector of Sudan, 
having a US$100 million oil prospecting investment in the country. The remainder of the 
large oil acquisitions in Sudan were completed by the ONGC, which has production and 
refining operations. One of the largest publicly declared investments was ONGC’s 
acquisition of oil refinery facilities totalling US$1.2 billion (Naidu 2008: 120). Resource-
seeking, a key motivation identified in the literature on Indian and Chinese firms’ investment 
in Africa, is one of the most important and prominent forms of FDI for emerging economies 
as their firms seek to acquire and more importantly secure the necessary resources to fuel the 
domestic economy. India is not a resource rich country and requires large exports of energy 
resources; Africa on the other hand is a resource rich region. While Africa does have many 
conflict prone regions in which oil is produced, the instability in the Middle East has been a 
perpetual thorn in the side of many states.  
 
The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting States (OPEC), of which only four African 
countries are members; Nigeria, Algeria, Libya and Angola, regulate pricing on barrels, has 
used oil pricing in the past for means beyond profits. Africa’s oil is more open to outside 
investment and is not governed in the way the OPEC states are. This has proven attractive to 
new investors. India’s investments can be found in exploration and production in states such 
as Sudan, Nigeria, Angola, Gabon and Congo (Desai, 2009: 424).  “Oil related equity 
abroad” by Indian firms is a strong motivation for acquisitions by state-owned firms such as 
the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), known as ONGC Videsh Limited (Ltd) 
internationally and the Gas Authority of India Ltd. (GAIL) (Hattari and Rajan, 2010: 507).   
At the end of 2004, India’s ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL), failed to complete the acquisition 
of a 45 per cent stake in the Akpo oilfield in Angola. New Delhi, citing ownership of the 
oilfield as problematic, failed to back the OVL deal, resulting in China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation (CNOOC) acquiring the 45 per cent stake (Wysoczańska, 2011: 195; 
Indiatimes.com, 2011). 
 
India’s African Mining Push  
Hydrocarbons are not the only sector of natural resources that Indian firms are currently 
attempting to access in Africa. Africa accounted for only four per cent of global metal and 
mining deals in 2009 and 8 per cent in 2010; a 50 per cent improvement (Cambell, 2011).  
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Last year, 86 mining related details were completed either in African firm outbound 
investments, 4, interregional firm investments, 11, and inbound non – African investment, 71 
(Cambell, 2011).  Vedanta Resources, a public conglomerate specialising in metals, has 
invested US$750 million in Zambian copper mines. Zambia’s copper dominated and 
undiversified economy is an attractive region for resource-seeking firms. Vedanta expanded 
into Namibia in 2010, acquiring Skorpion Zinc from Anglo-American in a deal worth 
US$707 million (Cambell, 2011). Liberia too has completed a twenty – five year deal that 
will see Arcelor Mittal establish a US$1 billion iron ore project that is set to employ some 
20 000 Liberians (Pham, 2007: 344).   
 
Coal India Limited, an SOE, saw the firm request the Mozambique government to extend 
their coal exploration by five blocks in addition to the current two blocks (Cambell, 2011). 
The deal is set to see the SOE begin the establishment of mining operations on the blocks 
with a five year plan of producing ten million tons of coal and the employment of 3000 
Mozambicans. The India Coal deal in Mozambique is an interesting development. This type 
of deal, while an SOE and controlled by the state, represents Strange’s (1988, 1992) 
argument, that large firms would increasingly engage and negotiate with governments and 
vice versa. The delegation that petitioned the Mozambican government for further blocks was 
India’s Coal Minister, Skripakash Kaiswal. The delegation and the targeting of Mozambique 
was part of a large plan to “acquire more coal assets” which will see the delegation explore 
further opportunities in Australia, Canada, the USA and Zimbabwe (Cropley and Mahlich, 
2011). Two motivations of the delegation that were outlined include the acquisition of 
strategic coal assets with the aim to address the “serious shortfall in terms of supply” 
(Cropley and Mahlich, 2011).The investments of India Coal as an SOE are motivated by 
resource and strategic-asset seeking, illustrating the state-backed firm, under the auspices of 
the Indian government negotiating for rights with a government.   
 
Market Seeking 
Market-seeking, the search for new markets or the consolidation of existing markets is an 
important investment motivation. Increasing competition in the home economy, whether by 
other domestic or foreign firms create scenarios where firms seek out new markets in which 
to expand. The banking sector of India is becoming less regulated in response to increasing 
domestic and international competition.  
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The State Bank of India (SBI) has expanded into Mauritius and Kenya to seek out new 
markets; recently acquiring a 51 per cent share in the Mauritius-based Indian Ocean 
International Bank Ltd. (Hattari and Rajan, 2010: 507). Access to “large developed-economy 
markets will likely result in increasing investment activity by Indian firms to finance further 
and larger acquisitions aboard” such as developing regions (Hattari and Rajan, 2010: 507). In 
2010, Indian telecoms giant Bharti Airtel Limited signed a US$9 billion deal to acquire 
Kuwait’s Zain’s “mobile operations in 15 African countries” (Tripathy and Goma, 2010). 
This is India’s second largest overseas acquisition since Tata Steel bought the British based 
Corus Group in 2007 (Tripathy and Goma, 2010). By 2012, Bharti is expected to have over 
100 million subscribers in Africa. Facing increasing competition in the Indian domestic 
economy, Bharti expanded into Africa despite the risks of investing on the continent, to 
capture new markets as it struggles to maintain a lead in the home economy (Tripathy and 
Goma, 2010).  
 
Looking at locational advantages, Bharti was aware of the pitfalls it may face operating in 
countries that have higher risk than others, but the granting of access to these markets and 
their size were advantageous to Zain, as they will be to Bharti Airtel and its subsidiary. One 
of the key financiers of the deal was SBI, which is an SOE. SBI, as a key investor in the 
Bharti deal, is an example of the role the state can assume in aiding Indian firms to go global. 
By financing the deal, Bharti Airtel has now acquired mobile operations in markets it would 
have struggled to access without such state banking finance.  Airtel Africa, Bharti Airtel’s 
subsidiary in Africa, now operates in 16 African states and places Airtel as the fifth largest 
mobile phone operator in the world.  In August, 2011, Bharti Airtel won a licence to operate 
2G and 3G in services in Rwanda with an initial investment over US$100 million over three 
years in a market that is projected to increase from four million subscribers in June 2011 to a 
projected six million by 2012 (Holliday, 2011).  
 
Between 2000 and 2009, Indian pharmaceutical firms completed five M&As totalling US$95 
million and accounted for 14 per cent of Indian pharmaceutical exports, which in 2008/2009 
was worth US$8 billion (Pradhan, 2010a: 18; Barka, 2011: 6). In the pharmaceuticals 
industry Indian firms have been expanding into new markets, Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories 
entered into a joint-venture with GlaxoSmithKlein in 2009 (Stanton, 2009). The joint-venture 
has seen Dr. Reddy’s manufacture up to a 100 branded drugs while Glaxo would do the 
licensing and marketing in Africa (Stanton, 2009).  
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The joint-venture sees the two companies form a business alliance that is geared toward 
expansion into “a range of high growth emerging markets” (Staton, 2011). This type of 
alliance sees Dr. Reddy making use of Glaxo’s ability for product development as Glaxo has 
been one of the most active companies of its time in emerging markets (Staton, 2011). In 
2008, the Indian pharmaceutical multinational Cipla, entered into a joint-venture with the 
government of Uganda and the Ugandan pharmaceutical manufacturer, Quality Chemicals 
Industries Ltd (Barka, 2011: 6). Along with being a joint-venture, a US$38 billion greenfield 
plant was built in the capital Kampala to manufacture anti-retroviral and anti-malarial drugs 
(Barka, 2011: 6).   
 
Indian automakers have invested heavily in Africa as they seek out new markets. Tata Motors 
and Mahindra & Mahindra have been exporting vehicles to Africa for over 30 years. But the 
revival of the African economy and the new levels of infrastructural development and the 
need for transport to meet industry demands, has provided new opportunities for Indian 
automakers. Tata Motors is a prime example of an Indian firm and automaker that has 
expanded its footprint in Africa. Since 2006, the Indian motor industry has been increasing its 
“number of plants, subsidiaries, and greenfield investments abroad” (Ruet, 2010: 89). Tata 
Motors is raising its company profile through the creation of smaller more environmentally 
friendly vehicles like the Nano which is targeted at consumers in the developing world. Tata 
Motors South Africa, a joint-venture with Tata Motors and Tata Africa recently completed 
the opening of a new plant in Johannesburg, South Africa (Naidoo, 2011). Tata Motors’ 
largest export market is South Africa and to better serve the market and to expand capacity, 
has localised production in South Africa (Venter, 2011).  
 
Market-seeking theory posits that this form of FDI is not simply to seek out a new market; in 
this case the market had already been established in South Africa. Rather this form of joint-
venture was one motivated by the expansion of business opportunities and to better serve the 
existing market through a more proximate plant. The establishment of the plant can also be 
motivated by Tata Motors’ ambition to protect the large market it has captured from new or 
existing competitors that may too invest in economies like South Africa; where the demand 
for affordable commercial and personal vehicles has increased (Naidoo, 2011).   
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4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter presented a macro overview of New Delhi’s role in facilitating OFDI, the 
drivers of internationalisation and motivations of India’s firms in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Hansen (2010) notes that since 2000, India’s motives for OFDI have undergone a period of 
change, with Indian firms investing abroad “due to pull factors” listing market and resource-
seeking as primary reasons. Push factors in the home economy are less influenced by 
overregulation, such as the period prior to the relaxation of capital controls and more of a 
supportive type whereby the Indian government actively promotes outward investments by its 
firms. While India has developed a strategic energy policy had clearly defined its energy 
requirements and projections of future use, resource-seeking is clearly a strong motivation for 
Indian firms, especially SOEs to invest in a continent known to contain highly sought after 
resources. Having stated this, it must be stressed that two-thirds of India’s OFDI has been 
market-seeking (Ramamurti and Singh, 2008).  
 
Tata Motors and Bharti Airtel were two studied firms that were motivated to expand into 
Africa primarily for market-seeking reasons. The other strong motivation was resource-
seeking, similar to China and typically emerging-economies as they capture resources to 
address shortfalls in demand in their economies. Limitations of available research made it 
difficult to find Indian firms that are motivated by efficiency-seeking and strategic-asset in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Although, as UNCTAD (2006: 160) note, Indian firms that are 
motivated to internationalise or outward invest in a host economy to seek out markets have 
efficiency-seeking closing tied to market-seeking as Indian firms see efficiency as “the 
international integration of production and service activities.” So while Tata was motivated to 
seek and protects its market in South Africa, the establishment of the plant is an example of 
efficiency-seeking as well as market-seeking.    
 
The last decade of Indian investment into Sub-Saharan Africa has been primarily driven by 
larger conglomerate firms of India, such as the Tata Group, in comparison to the small to 
medium enterprises that invested in Africa in the past. While China is often associated with 
being a hybrid economy, one which engenders market orientated policies with state control, 
India’s political economy of internationalisation seems to be growing into one similar to that 
of China’s, albeit with slight variations. New Delhi, while lacking strong directed policies 
over the last decade have, pushed to create policies that favour internationalisation.  
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The reduction on outward investment caps, the growing presence of Indian SOEs in the 
global economy and the creating of cooperative mechanisms and India’s thrust for further 
diplomatic representation and engagement with African states are indications of India’s 
desire to expand outward politically, diplomatically and economically in Africa.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
56 
 
Chapter 5: Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment and Multinationals 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a macro analysis of Chinese OFDI and multinationals in Africa. The 
first part of the chapter outlines the political economy of China and the impact that state 
policies governing investments have had on the outward investment of Chinese firms. The 
latter part of the chapter focuses on the drivers of internationalisation the motivations for 
Chinese outward investments. The motivations for Chinese outward investments are outlined 
along with an analysis of Chinese multinationals that either internationalised or invested 
abroad because of the respective motivation, establishing whether it was strategic, resource or 
market-seeking.  The chapter establishes that China’s “Go Global” policy has been a 
definitive aspect of the country’s sizeable and growing presence in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
5.2 Background 
China has become the leading emerging economy and outward investor in the global 
economy (Buckley et al., 2008: 107; Deng, 2003: 113). China overtook Japan at the end of 
2010 to become the second largest economy in the world behind the US (Monahan, 2011). 
Since the end of the 1970s, when then Premier Deng Xiaoping began the opening of the 
Chinese economy to the world in the “Reform and Opening” policy; China, an economically 
reserved state, began its powerful four decade economic expansion which has spanned the 
globe (McDonald, 2011). In 2000, Chinese OFDI was relatively small, equivalent to US$916 
million (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2009: 554). According to the Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM) 2010 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment (2010: 
79), OFDI for 2010 was US$68.8 billion. In 2010, Chinese OFDI was sitting at US$2.1 
billion in Africa, the second lowest OFDI destination, ahead only to Oceania (MOFCOM, 
2010: 83). It was from the year 2000 and onwards that China’s OFDI began to grow to the 
levels that one can account for today. The developmental process, the industrialisation and 
liberalising of the economy had matured China’s investment competences. General skills as 
well as technical and managerial, scientific and physical infrastructure and skills were honed 
during the period preceding the expansion and thereafter even more so (Hong, 2011: 
4).Chinese firms that have internationalised are highly competitive and their operations 
firmly supported and often financed through China’s state run banking institutions.   
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The large scale acquisitions of these firms are motivated to secure new markets, resources 
and strategic assets (Alden and Davis, 2006: 83).  Beijing’s intervention in Chinese OFDI can 
be viewed in four differing aspects, firstly the widely known role of state owned enterprises 
involved in African investment projects; secondly Beijing’s resource seeking and backing of 
such FDI; thirdly the general political economy framework of China and fourthly the rigorous 
control and regulation of Chinese OFDI, attributed to China’s economic and developmental 
objectives and ideological obligations (Buckley et al., 2008: 107). China 61 corporations 
listed on the Fortune Global 500, a staggering 13 per cent of the top earning global 
corporations are Chinese. Compared to India’s 8, one can see the highly competitive and 
lucrative corporations that hail from China. According to Hong (2011: 31), “Chinese firms 
are now among the world’s most respected as a result of their rapid internationalisation and 
growing importance in world business.” While China is one of the largest recipients of FDI 
from other economies in its economy, its own firms are becoming significant players in 
outward FDI (Yeung and Liu, 2008: 58).  
 
With more than a trillion dollars in foreign exchange and the increasing economic power to 
utilise these funds, China’s ‘flagship’ firms invest abroad acquiring new technologies, 
resources, brands and better or new access to global markets (Morck et al., 2008: 337). The 
foreign acquisitions of Chinese firms like Lenovo, Haier, CNOOC and Sinopec regularly 
grab the attention of the media.  The nature of the Chinese political economy distorts “capital 
allocation in ways that generate FDI in certain sectors” (Morck et al., 2008: 338). 
Historically, of the Chinese-owned investment projects in Africa from 1979 to 2000, and in 
value terms, manufacturing especially spinning, weaving textiles and agro processing 
accounted for 64 percent, while resource-based industries, timber, and mining accounted for 
28 percent. The volume and share of Chinese OFDI in resource extraction; mining and 
petroleum industries, has increased parallel with the country’s resource needs.  
 
The country specific location of Chinese OFDI in Africa is “highly diversified” with 
important destinations being Zambia, Sudan and South Africa (Zafar, 2007: 123). Chinese 
multinationals in Africa are said to number over 700 and operate in fifty out of fifty-four 
African states (Zafar, 2007: 123). African investments in China however are meagre, with the 
exception of SABMiller, a South African brewer and Sasol, which has expanded its mining 
activities in China’s coal regions (Zafar, 2007: 123).China’s contemporary relations with 
Africa are found in three key forms of cooperation; trade, investment and aid.  
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A portion of Chinese resource seeking FDI in infrastructure has an aid dimension, a business 
strategy that China has successfully used in other key economies like Angola (UNERA, 
2011: 57).   
 
5.3 Political Economy of China and its Institutions  
The “political economy perspective conceptualises the nation state as a capitalist institution 
whose existence ensures the reproduction of the capitalist mode of production” (Yeung and 
Liu, 2008: 60).  The Chinese political economy is the sole force in shaping not only the entire 
domestic economy, but its relation with the global economy.  
 
Comparisons have been made between the established multinationals of the North and those 
of the South and the differing motivations of OFDI and drivers of internationalisation. China 
has for over four decades shifted from a command economy to a more market-orientated, 
albeit heavily state influenced form of capitalism. Alden and Davies (2006: 85) acknowledge 
that the strategy, motivations and operations of Chinese multinationals abroad are the result 
of a single government’s control over an economy that has for several decades’ experienced 
sound economic growth. The Chinese government’s “Going Global” strategy is certainly one 
of a political dimension, founded within the framework of Beijing’s national interests and the 
drive to continually make Chinese firms more competitive and efficient (Luo et al., 2009: 3). 
It wasn’t until the late 1970s that China’s entry into the global economy became a policy, as 
the state embarked on a new economic path following the death of Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong 
was a founder of the modern People’s Republic of China and the architect of China’s 
industrialisation. In the wake of his death, his successor Deng Xiaoping, guided a new 
economic path, transforming China into “a market economy open to international competition 
(Renard, 2011: 27). China, in the liberalisation of the 1970s, was focused on attracting inward 
FDI, with little attention paid to outward FDI.  
 
In contemporary times, increasing globalisation has placed Beijing in an advantageous 
position whereby it can exploit globalisation in order to project its political and economic 
power beyond its borders, with Africa being a target of such power projection. Beijing 
realised it could solidify its influence regionally and globally in globalisation, which would 
see China integrate further into the world economy and engage in increasingly political 
economic transactions with other developing regions and economies in the world.  
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Creating changes to outward investment policies, Beijing began to create incentives for 
OFDI, decentralising and “streamlining administrative procedure, lower restrictions on 
capital controls, providing provision and information of investments as well as reducing 
political and financial risks of investments (Luo et al., 2009: 3). Institutionally, there are a 
handful of bureaucracies that manage China’s OFDI; the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC), Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA), the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), 
Ministry of Finance, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) and China’s 
various banking institutions (van der Lugt et al., 2011: 37).  
 
MOFCOM is the primary government body through which outward investments are 
coordinated and is tasked with formulating development strategies, drafting of laws and 
regulations; which govern domestic and foreign trade, investment and economic cooperation. 
MOFCOM is as such a warden, approving the internationalisation process of domestic firms 
and later supervising their operations abroad (van der Lugt et al., 2011: 38).  Two separate 
departments within MOFCOM are actively involved in the regulation of the Chinese outward 
investment regime. The Department of Foreign Economic Cooperation (DFEC) is 
accountable in governing all Chinese OFDI and Chinese labour abroad (van der Lugt et al., 
2011: 38). Chinese firms which have FDI above US$ 10 000 are requisite to the DFEC before 
pursuing outward investment. The second of the two departments is the office of the 
Economic and Commercial Counsellor (ECC) which is placed abroad at Chinese embassies 
whereupon they, under the jurisdiction of missions abroad, monitor Chinese firms and their 
investments in host economies (van der Lugt et al., 2011: 38). 
 
5.3.1 Going Global  
China’s engagement with Africa is not one dimensional, as Beijing has woven together 
several elements that compose its strategy of corporate engagement with Africa (Gill and 
Reilly, 2007: 38). Chinese diplomats and members of the political party use diplomatic, 
economic and developmental policies to woo African leaders and to further pave the 
investment paths between China and other African States. The economic brass of the country 
and the various bureaucracies motivate domestic firms, mainly state owned-enterprises to 
seek trade and investment in Africa. China’s “going global” strategy is to a large degree 
being driven by their SOEs and firms, which produce affordable consumer goods, engage in 
resource extraction, transportation, and infrastructure and development projects.  
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Chinese firms are able to expand into Africa as many domestic economies have become less 
competitive with many local and international firms lacking competitive advantages 
(Kragelund, 2009: 480). Chinese outward investment is well endowed with access to cheap 
capital. There is the “preferential access to capital at preferential rates” which is supplied by 
Beijing and its banks to non-state firms. Non-state firms often find themselves further 
supported by the government; if Beijing has confidence that these firms either serve a 
national interest and/or the necessary advantages to compete on an international scale 
(Shenkar, 2009: 155). 
 
5.3.2 Evolution of China’s Policies on OFDI 
China is currently in the fifth stage of outward investment (Yeung and Liu, 2008: 65). Stage 
four, which was from 1999 – 2002 was the genesis of what is considered China’s 
contemporary investment path. Having recognised the potential and importance of domestic 
firms and their status in the global economy, Beijing implemented policies that that 
encouraged firms to invest in markets abroad. (Yeung and Liu, 2008: 65). Beijing 
furthermore back Chinese firms through favourable tax, financial and foreign exchange 
assistance (Yeung and Liu, 2008: 65). Stage five, the going global or Stepping Out strategy is 
the period in which analysts place contemporary Chinese investments. These new policies are 
seen as a continuation of the liberalisation of the Chinese economy which spans over forty 
years now. Beijing and the business interests that are at stake in SOEs and other forms of 
ownership firms aimed to move beyond creating large trade and investment margins, but the 
creations of competitive brands with ‘world-class’ edge that could compete without more 
established brands and companies (Yeung and Liu, 2008: 65).  
 
The new policy changes in Chinese FDI include, sustaining and tailoring incentives that are 
not only practical, but cost-effective, reducing bureaucracy and ‘streamlining’ administrative 
procedures which includes greater transparency and the decentralisation of economic 
planning to local government levels (Yeung and Liu, 2008: 65). Chinese financial institutions 
are gearing to ease capital controls, provide Chinese investors with viable investment options 
acquired through state – level interactions with other states and the diversification of 
investments with the aim of risk reduction (Yeung and Liu, 2008: 65).  
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5.4 Overview of Chinese Multinationals and Business Strategies  
5.4.1 Background 
China’s presence in Africa illustrates a departure from what occurred in the post-colonial era 
where “aid, trade and FDI vectors were increasingly separated” (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2009: 
561). Strategic integration of Chinese inputs in Africa is particularly notable in “large scale 
infrastructural and mining projects” (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2009: 561). The so called 
Angola-mode is an interesting framework that China, specifically its SOEs, has utilised as a 
business strategy on the continent.  
 
It is package that is extended to African states in which the Chinese EXIM bank provides 
lines of credit to an African state, at a subsided interest rate, to which large Chinese firms 
then engage in tenders for resource or infrastructural, in some cases both, that could include 
railways, hydrocarbons are mining. These funds are then linked to Chinese inputs; aid is then 
transferred from the EXIM bank to the Chinese firms that have been awarding contracts. 
These funds are not grants, but are rather repaid by the host economy as a “drawdown” on the 
commodities that are exported back to China.  Since 2004, China has used these deals in 7 
resource-rich African states with a total of almost US$14 billion (Brautigam, 2010). The idea 
behind such projects, in the spirit of goodwill and developmental cooperation that China 
attempts to exude on the continent, resource-backed deals create “an agency of restraint” 
ensuring that some of the wealth generated from natural resources is placed in projects that 
will benefit the host economy (Brautigam, 2010).  
 
Backward and Vertical Integration 
Chinese firms involved in extractive industries like hydrocarbons “are acquiring upstream 
assets in order to secure resources and commodities (Alden, 2006: 86). Upstream assets refer 
to those parts of the industry which are “responsible for the exploration and recovery of oil 
and natural gas reserves” (BusinessDictionary.Com, 2011).Sinopec’s large investments in oil 
rich states such as Angola and Sudan are examples of this. Sinopec in 2010 announced it 
would acquire more upstream assets to “boost capacity and reduce reliance on its volatile 
refining business (Lau, 2010). Downstream activities are those that include sales and delivery 
(BusinessDictionary.com, 2011).  CNOOC for instance is investing in downstream activities, 
such as retail, petrochemicals and power generation.  
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State Resources and Energy Security 
Through their preferential access to state capital Chinese firms are engaging in acquisitions 
not only in Africa, but in South America and the Middle East too (Alden and Davies, 2006: 
86). Beijing supports and oversees the purchasing of many “international energy assets” 
through financing and development projects tied to such investments (Alden and Davies, 
2006: 87).This form of investment is common in Africa and is found to entice leaders in these 
states as the prospects of such investments that Beijing offers are highly competitive, relative 
to those offered by other competing states.  
 
Partnerships and Joint Ventures 
Joint-ventures have become a corporate strategy for Chinese firms when investing abroad. 
Such joint ventures and partnerships that Chinese firms are engaging in are of Western and 
non-Western origin and provide technological and managerial gains as well as creating 
possible connections to the political establishment in states China may has only limited ties to 
(Alden and Davies, 2006: 87).  
 
Parent Satellite Investments 
China’s firms are establishing a global presence and some of these firms are attempting to 
move towards creating an “independent presence” which can be challenging, as many remain 
under the “control of the parent company in China” (Alden and Davies, 2006: 87).   Lenovo 
for instance, which bought out IBM in 2005 is a subsidiary of Legend Holdings Ltd, whose 
majority shareholder is the Chinese Academy of Sciences, which is an institution of the State 
Council of China (Alden and Davies, 2006: 87; Legendholdings.com.cn, 2011; cas.cn, 2011).  
 
OLI Paradigm 
Dunning (1980: 4) states “the advantages or disadvantages of particular locations are treated 
separately from ownership advantage of particular enterprises, and the market for these 
advantage are internalized; the decision on where to site a mine, factory or office, is not 
independent of the ownership of these assets, nor of the route by which they or their rights are 
transacted.” Even so, Chinese foreign policy and its Africa policy are key determinants of 
Beijing investment, as firms “are not necessarily independent of the Chinese government” 
(Adisu et al., 2010: 6). Chinese investments in Africa are usually advantageous due to little 
domestic and foreign competition, although the latter does differ, especially when it comes to 
natural resources.  
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Chinese firms still compete for resources alongside Northern and Southern firms. Increased 
risk however on the continent due to political instability, threat of conflict and so on 
alongside the absence of public goods create competition gaps for Chinese firms to exploit, 
regardless of how extensive their OLI advantages may be (Adisu et al., 2010: 6).  Sizeable 
amounts of inward FDI into China brought technological and organisational skills into China, 
adding to firms’ ownership advantages that once transferred, strengthened the capabilities of 
Chinese firms wanting to expand abroad.  
 
Along with support from Beijing, the internationalisation of these firms was dualistic, with 
factors in the home economy being favourable and the advantages that could be exploited in a 
host economy being advantageous too. Chinese OFDI however could not expand into regions 
like Africa wholly on its firms’ ownership advantages. There are a few reasons for this; chief 
amongst them is that FDI must be chosen a channel in which to do business. Trade and 
licensing are two viable alternatives for firms to do business when transaction costs are high 
and financing for firms to expand is weak.  However, provided ownership and internalisation 
occur, locational factors such as market size, resources, favourable policy, political risk and 
so forth in a host economy exist, FDI will occur.  
 
Advantages can increase in a host economy when Chinese firms have through acquisition or 
greenfield investments established manufacturing output abroad to serve markets and in it 
developed further competences that would strengthen the firm. Haier experienced this as 
white-goods suppler in Africa as well as other smaller Chinese firms who established in 
Africa to source and produce in local economies, taking advantage of their innovative 
capacity for mass scale production (Deng, 2003: 121). Locational advantages in Africa have 
improved and this is can be seen in the trends of investment and presence of emerging 
economies looking to invest and also compete in the region. The liberalisation of the 
regulatory regimes in South-East Asia along with prime natural resources and a Chinese 
diaspora was a major motivating factor for Chinese investment in the 1990s second only to 
proximity (Deng, 2003: 122). This occurred within the years preceding the African policy, 
but nevertheless establishes a level of continuity in Chinese investments abroad. What the 
paradigm illustrates is that no matter the pull of the host economy and the push of the home 
economy or the firm advantages that grant them the ability to invest abroad or the 
motivations of this FDI, provided a firm that is internationalising can exploit its advantages, 
the firm will invest.  
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5.5 Drivers of Internationalisation and Motivations for FDI 
5.5.1 Introduction 
This section provides a macro overview, citing specific firm’s investments as context, of the 
“mix of factors and motivations that drive the outward FDI of mainland transnational firms” 
(Yeung and Liu, 2008: 68). Increasing FDI flows from China to African countries occurs 
alongside increasing political, economic and diplomatic ties. South Africa is the leading 
recipient of China’s outward FDI flows in Africa accounting for 40 per cent of all Chinese 
FDI stock valued at US$3 billion (UNTACD, 2010b: 84).  The reasons and motivations for 
Chinese firms to enter foreign markets are somewhat consistent with firms from other 
emerging economies, but differences do exist. On a national level these motives can either be 
financial, political or nationally strategic (Shenkar, 2009: 155).  Corkin (2007: 311) regards 
the motivations amongst SOEs to be related to maintaining of production levels, additional 
sources of raw materials and the acquisition of new foreign technology.  
 
Chinese firms, like those of over emerging economies, have five primary motivations to 
expand into foreign markets.  These motivations are primarily, resources, technology and 
markets as well as diversification and the acquisition of strategic assets (Corkin, 2007: 311). 
As Deng (2003: 115) illustrates, while industry specific firms like China National Offshore 
Oil Corporation (CNOOC) will be motivated by resources and hence engage in resource 
seeking OFDI, motivations can become varied and firms may be motivated by a multitude of 
factors. Chinese telecommunications firms for instance are unlikely invest in Africa to seek 
out new technologies, but rather markets or strategic assets so as to increase competitive 
advantages. Market-seeking is the most prominent and prevalent form of FDI in 
internationalisation strategies of emerging economies’ firms with 51 per cent of these firms 
stating it as their motivation to invest abroad (UNTACD, 2006: 158).  
 
5.5.2 FDI Motivations 
Resource-Seeking FDI 
Energy security is becoming as much a strategic issue as it is an economic issue, especially 
for countries like China. China is the world’s largest energy consumer and second largest 
consumer of oil after the US and finds itself in a precarious position when it comes to 
securing resources (Lai, 2007, 519). In a world of finite resources, the acquisition of 
resources and the removal of competitors to ensure access to hydrocarbons, minerals and 
metals are paramount.  
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China has a mere two per cent of the world’s reserves of oil and only one per cent of world 
gas reserves (Dorraj and Currie, 2008: 70). The “Going Global” policy has encouraged the 
three top Chinese hydrocarbon firms CNOOC, Sinopec and CNPC to expand abroad to 
secure energy supplies (Dorraj and Currie, 2008: 74).  China’s drive for resources continues 
to be a key talking point in the discourses of Chinese involvement in Africa and this no 
different in the literature pertaining to emerging economies’ investments in Africa. The 
reason Deng (2008: 115) suggests that unfair attention is awarded to such investments is 
anecdotal in that while China does have natural resources “it’s per capita availability of such 
resources is very low, particularly for such resources as iron ore, aluminium, copper, 
petroleum, timber, and fish” prompting many of its SOEs to engage in resource-seeking FDI 
and other modes of entry (Nolan and Zhang, cited in Deng 2008: 115).   
 
Firms will establish foreign subsidiaries in various locations in a region or host economy in 
order to ensure adequate supply of sought after natural resources. Large investments in such 
projects are usually completed through M&As (Deng, 2003: 115). The M&A route allows 
Chinese firms to swiftly gain access to new markets acquiring exiting firms so as to “obtain 
local network(s) of distribution and suppliers (Deng, 2003: 115).   In 2010, 20 per cent of 
global M&As in the oil and gas industry were completed by Chinese firms PetroChina, China 
National Petroleum Corp (CNPC), the parent company of PetroChina, CNOOC and Sinopec. 
As a method of entry, China’s rising M&A activity on the continent has resulted in an oil and 
gas footprint in Africa that is growing (Pretorius, 2011). However, M&As as mode of entry 
into a host economy is not always the primary mode as this differs from sector to sector and 
state to state.  
 
Regulatory regimes in a host economy can be less than accommodating for foreign firms, 
especially in an era of increasing environmental awareness, habitat spoliation and broader 
human security issues. Increasing competitiveness on the continent over resources has also 
made the concept of ‘easy oil’ a fallacy (Pretorius, 2011). Chinese firms, despite what many 
regard as ones that are willing to take more risk than some other firms, too want stability and 
security for their investments. Africa is risky place to invest and the presence of resources 
often exacerbates these risks whether geographically or politically (Pretorius, 2011). Joint-
ventures as a mode of entry are seen to be less risk adverse than M&As or greenfield projects.  
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African states are aware of the need to ensure their firms too share in such finds and later 
their extraction, which has resulted in Chinese firms entering into joint – ventures with other 
state-owned enterprises in Sudan, Nigeria, and Angola (Pretorius, 2011). As Alden notes 
(2006: 87) “linking up with existing firms, both Western and non-Western, is increasingly 
part of the Chinese corporate strategy abroad.”  
 
Earlier this year, CNOOC partnered up with Total S.A, a French firm and Tullow Oil plc, a 
British firm in Uganda (Pretorius, 2011).  Chinese resource FDI is large scale and “involves a 
majority of Chinese foreign assets” (Deng, 2003: 115). Chinese firm Sichuan Hongda 
recently inked a US$3 billion deal with Tanzania for mining of coal and iron ore (Ng, 
wanakilala, 2011). The investment includes the construction of the Mchuchuma coal mine, a 
600MW thermal power station and the Liganga iron ore mine located in the south of the 
country (Ng, wanakilala, 2011). This joint-venture is considered to be the single largest 
investment in East Africa and will see Sichuan Hongda owning an 80 per cent share, the 
remaining 20 per cent stake will be held by Tanzania’s state-run body the National 
Development Corporation (NDC), although this could increase to 49 per cent after the 
Chinese firm recovers the cost of the investment (Ng, wanakilala, 2011).   
 
Market-Seeking  
Arguably one of the most crucial motivations for firms to invest abroad is to seek out new 
markets in which to do business. This form of FDI or activity is especially important for 
emerging economies for a number of reasons. Unlike some of the established firms from the 
developed countries who have expanded into foreign markets decades earlier, emerging 
markets and their firms find themselves looking for new opportunities beyond their domestic 
economies. Chinese firms are then put into a position whereby they seek out new markets for 
their products. This type of investment sees Chinese firms internationalise to “protect or 
sustain existing markets or to explore or promote new markets: (Deng, 2003: 116). This is 
especially true of Chinese manufacturing which has reached surplus in the domestic 
economy, “limiting effective demand” (Den, 2003: 116).   
 
Another sector which is gaining traction in Africa as it continues to seek out new markets is 
the telecommunications sector, with such Chinese firms as Huawei and ZTE being big 
players (Gugler, 2008).  
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Huawei, one of the world’s largest suppliers of telecommunications to service providers has 
recently moved into the smartphone and tablet arena. Huawei, unlike many other Chinese 
multinationals in Africa has no government stake and is one of the rare cases of such Chinese 
private multinational that is so globally competitive. Huawei is a wholly- owned subsidiary of 
Shenzhen Huawei Investment & Holdings Co which “is solely owned by employees of the 
Company, without any third parties, including government bodies, holding any of its shares” 
(Huawei.com, 2011).   
 
In a continent where cellular phone usage and sales are growing drastically, Huawei has 
targeted Nigeria’s economy for the release of its US$100 Ideos smartphone (Connors and 
Maylie, 2011). Through exploring new markets, Huawei is targeting a figure of US$6 billion 
in revenue from device sales (Pila, 2011). ZTE likewise is expanding into Sub-Saharan 
Africa to seek out new markets. The Chinese firm recently won a 1900 kilometre fibre project 
by three independent investors in South Africa (Globaltelcomsbusiness.com, 2011). Between 
2007 and 2009, ZTE signed contracts that almost totalled US$1.5 billion with Ethiopia 
Telecom for network projects across the country. These projects were funded by the China 
Development Bank, an SOE. The result of the contracts by ZTE in Ethiopia saw the number 
of mobile phone users increase by 3.1 million between 2007 and 2009 (FOCAC.org, 2011).    
As the demand for mobile, wireless and fixed-line internet services increases in Africa, such 
firms as Huawei and ZTE will seek out such markets which exhibit growth. 
Telecommunications will use such new markets as proving grounds for further expansion, as 
is occurring in Nigeria, but also to establish dominance in these new markets before they 
become too competitive.   
 
Strategic-Asset Seeking 
Strategic-asset seeking is a form of FDI whereby firms “tap into or develop strategic 
resources in a foreign market, and exploit such assets as market intelligence, technological 
know-how, management expertise, and reputation for being established in a prestigious 
market” (Deng, 2007: 74). Chinese firms, while attracted to Sub-Saharan African markets for 
a variety of reasons do exploit those where competition is weak but at times also where it is 
strong. Some Chinese firms will invest in markets that are known to serve competitors (Deng, 
2003: 118).  
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The motivation for this is to increase global stature and competiveness by directly competing 
with other firms “as part of their global production and marketing strategies” (Deng, 2003: 
118). A good example of such a firm is the Haier Group. Haier, founded in 1985, set forward 
an ambitious globalising strategy in 1999 that saw the firm competing with established 
brands and firms from Japan and Korean in foreign markets. Part of this globalising strategy 
has been to engage in localising manufacturing in economies to which it is targeting. Haier 
have done this through joint-ventures in North Africa as well as manufacturing plants in 
South Africa (people.com.cn, 2005; China.org.cn, 2007). The Chinese government has 
influenced the strategic decisions of Haier and has provided necessary support and assistance 
to Haier through the China Investment Corp (CIC); a sovereign wealth fund that was 
mandated to assist Chinese firms in acquisitions abroad (Duysters et al., 2008: 19). While 
such financing was done through a fund, Haier was directly financed, along with six other 
large Chinese firms, with US$ 3.1 million to fund initial costs of its globalising strategy 
(Duysters, et al., 2008: 19).  Haier’s success at being able to build a global brand and service 
markets in Sub-Saharan Africa through its greenfield manufacturing plants illustrates that 
Beijing, has been a “supporter and facilitator of firms” (Duysters et al., 2008: 19).    
 
Haier is an example of a firm that has engaged in a globalising strategy by localising 
manufacturing in key regional markets “to promote their long-term strategic objectives” and 
not simply rely on the exploitation of existing resources, but also to “accumulate new 
knowledge and skills” (Deng, 2003: 119). This strategy has evidently worked as Haier now 
competes with multinationals like Whirlpool Corporation, from the United States, which 
internationalised several years before Haier did. Haier has been since 2009 been the top 
appliance manufacturer in the world with a market share of 6.1 per cent (Jones, 2010).  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
China’s global economic strategy is largely shaped by its national development objectives 
(Osei and Mubiru, 2010: 1). Large foreign exchange reserves and the needs of securing 
resources and knowledge were instrumental in the formulation of China’s “go global” policy. 
China had for many years been a target of large inward FDI in the last decade has become a 
source of large OFDI flows in the global economy. Resource capture by Chinese firms in 
Africa has been one of the forms of outward expansion that has garnered the most academic 
and media attention. This is exemplified by the high-profile operations of SOEs in the 
hydrocarbon sector like Sinopec and CNOOC.  
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Understandably as the implications of hydrocarbon extraction is not only capital intensive but 
impacts the local environment far more than say market-seeking or strategic-asset seeking 
forms of investment. The necessity of the Chinese government to address the inadequacies of 
their energy resources is exemplified in the role of directing its SOEs to invest in Africa to 
address shortfalls.  China has over 800 SOEs in the African economy, a testament to the 
strategy that Beijing has employed in their outward investment drive in Africa, one which is 
state guided and financed. Resource diplomacy has been a prominent feature of the 
modernisation programme (Cheng and Shi, 2009: 111). In order for China to keep its 
modernisation programmes on track it will need to maintain and possibly expand its various 
strategic and diplomatic partnerships in Africa and abroad.  
 
As the UNCTAD (2006: 160) noted efficiency-seeking FDI is largely unimportant to Chinese 
firms, instead being motivated by resources, markets and strategic assets. It was for this 
reason that efficiency-seeking was absent in this chapter. Telecommunications firms such as 
ZTE and Huawei expanded into Africa to seek out new markets, similar to Haier although 
Haier was driven to establish a world brand too. While different to the ‘central’ SOEs of 
China, mainly the hydrocarbon based multinationals, ZTE and Haier are not privately owned, 
leaving Huawei as one of the largest privately owned Chinese multinationals operating in 
Africa.   
 
In economic nationalism it is held “that economic activities are and should be subordinate to 
the goal of state-building and the interests of the state” (Gilpin, 1987:31). Arguably, what can 
be deduced from preliminary assessments is that Chinese investments in Sub-Saharan Africa 
and abroad are as strategic as they are pragmatic and that the hand of government has aided 
Chinese firms to exploit their advantages and invest in markets abroad correlates to economic 
nationalism. The measures taken within the government to reduce bureaucracy, increase 
incentives and provide finance for firms to expand in order to either seek out new markets or 
resources is part of Beijing’s centrally planned strategy to geared toward prompting key 
sectors in the economy to access international markets (Corkin, 2007: 310). This level of 
state-planned capitalism has afforded China and its firm’s competitive advantages and global 
reach as China expands in Africa and abroad, with a supportive, politically and economically 
engineered strategy of competing globally with established multinationals.   
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews and concludes the primary question that was asked at the beginning of 
the thesis “What motivates Indian and Chinese firms to engage in outward foreign direct 
investment in Sub-Saharan Africa and to what extent do New Delhi and Beijing’s political 
and economic policies influence the internationalisation of these firms into African host 
economies?” Key secondary questions included:  
 
1. What forms of FDI are India and Chinese firms engaged in and what is the 
sectoral orientation of these firms?  
2. What advantages do Indian and Chinese firms exploit when expanding into Africa 
and are the motivations for such investments driven primarily by ‘pushing’ factors 
in the home economy or ‘pull’ factors in the host economy or possibly both?  
3. What are the forms of ownership, private or public, of Indian and Chinese firms 
investing in Africa 
4. What are the similarities and differences of Indian and Chinese investments in 
Africa? 
This chapter provides an overview of the findings made within the chapters and presents 
recommendations for possible future research in the field of emerging economy investments 
in Africa and outlines the implications that these findings may have on the theory and the 
literature.  
 
6.2 Key Findings and Implications  
Multinationals have had operations and trading relationships with African states for decades 
(Broadman, 2007a: 349). However the increasing presence of multinationals from emerging 
economies investing and servicing the markets of the continent has begun to change. Africa 
will have to “leverage the newfound investment and trade interest of India and China so that 
the continent can become a more proactive player” in the global economy (Broadman, 2007a: 
350).  The changing dynamics on the continent and the forging of new partnerships with 
other emerging economies has created “new impulses in Africa’s external relations” (Naidu 
et al., 2009: 2).  
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While the implications for Africa were not a core question, it has been briefly mentioned in 
the study as it is an important aspect of the long term aspects of increasing investments by 
emerging economies in the continent.  The rise of competitive multinationals from emerging 
economies is “part of a profound shift in the world economy” (UNCTAD, 2006: 245). The 
globalisation of firms from emerging economies in the international economic system may 
not be a new phenomenon, but it’s certainly a growing one (Yeung and Liu, 2008: 58). The 
past two decades have seen the level of FDI from firms and multinationals of emerging 
economies expand exponentially. Developed economies share of global GDP is falling, 
which is had an effect on patterns of international trade, finance and investment flows 
(UNCTAD, 2006: 245).  
 
India and Chinese firms have benefitted from state support in their investments in Sub-
Saharan Africa; state support is thus one of the key advantages Indian and Chinese firms, at 
the host economy level have exploited.  Two such firms that have had an advantage when 
investing in Sub-Saharan Africa as outlined in Chapters four and five were multinationals 
such as India’s Bharti Airtel and China’s Haier who have in the last decade become highly 
competitive in markets in Sub-Saharan Africa, with either direct or indirect government 
support or finance. Financing of outward investments by New Delhi and Beijing’s state-
owned banks has afforded firms the funds necessary to capitalise on their firm-specific 
advantages and internationalise, or simply expand into new markets. Bharti Airtel’s 
acquisition of Zain was financed primarily by the State Bank of India. Haier was able to seek 
out strategic-assets and become a global brand through the funding and guidance of 
acquisitions abroad by China’s many finance and commerce institutions.    
 
Liberal reforms in the investment regime of Indian and Chinese OFDI has allowed their firms 
to expand abroad in M&As as well as greenfield investments (Athreye and Kapur, 2009: 
216). To Indian and Chinese firms, an important motivation to expand into host economies 
has been to seek out new markets, protect existing markets from competitors and to have 
more proximate access to these markets. Another important motivation has been to secure 
access to raw materials and natural resources (Athreye and Kapur, 2009: 215). In both India 
and China, restrictive policies on OFDI prohibited initial outward expansion of its firms and 
the liberalisation of such regulatory regimes has seen the presence of Indian and Chinese in 
the global economy and Sub-Saharan Africa grow.  
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Push factors were certainly present in the first decades of outward investment by India and to 
a far lesser extent, China, where those firms that had the necessary advantages to expand did 
so, although their success in being granted the opportunity to do so was not widely shared. 
Firms that managed to internationalise were the exception, rather than the norm, an example 
being the Birla Group of India. Pull factors do appear to be more important to both India and 
China in the contemporary wave of investments abroad, as opposed to push factors when 
both economies had strict regulatory regimes on outward investments.  This is backed by 
research completed in the World Investment Report (2006: 155) which postulates that 
“market pull factors are likely to be the foremost determinants of FDI in particular host 
economies” furthermore firms “invest in host countries because of their resources; these refer 
to a wide variety of potential factors inputs including natural resources, labour and 
infrastructure.”  
 
The contemporary expansion of Indian and Chinese investments in Sub-Saharan Africa is 
thus dualistic, favourable government policy in the home economy and ‘pull factors’ in the 
host economy result in a favourable investment regime for Indian and Chinese firms in the 
region. India and China have notable differences in the ownership structure of their firms. 
While India’s thrust into Africa has primarily been one led by the private sector, unlike 
China’s which has been primarily driven by SOEs, most of India’s resource seeking firms in 
Africa are state-owned. The linkage of resource security to India and China’s hydrocarbon 
SOEs, in the form of promoting a going global agenda illustrates how strategic these 
investments are. 
 
The internationalisation thrust of China is viewed as being more top-down that India’s, as 
China’s OFDI is considered to be a reflection of Beijing’s political objectives, not simply 
driven by profit-maximisation like India’s firms (Hong, 2011: 21). Hence, China’s Sub-
Saharan investment strategy, which is far more politically orientated than India’s, is largely 
shaped by its national development objectives. South-South economic engagement has been a 
key component of India and China’s relations with Africa. South-South co-operative 
engagement includes an array of alliances that are geared towards creating environments in 
which African states can gain necessary capital, infrastructure and developmental expertise of 
Indian and Chinese programmes. Building on the historical ties of non-alignment and 
solidarity during the Cold War, India and China have done well to build on these historical 
legacies and forge new strategic partnerships in the developing world.  
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To Africa, this helping hand is one in which the chance at actual development and the 
creation of sustainable economic growth is more tangible and progressive than that which 
was offered to African states in the post-colonial era by the North. The hand that is being 
extended by India and China to Africa seems to be pragmatic, motivated by long-term goals 
of developing strategic alliances with African partners instead of short – term exploitative 
links. Both India and China appear to be committed to a long term plan in Africa. Not only 
have they strengthened the resolve of their presence in Africa through the different 
programmes and preferential loans, but also worked to solidify Africa as an integral part of 
the changing dynamics of the global economy within the South-South framework. 
 
Africa will have to leverage India and China’s growing presence politically and economically 
if African states are intent on diversifying their economies and not simply promote and 
continue relying on primary industries. Exposed competition to multinationals in Africa is 
arguably perceived to be a zero-sum game with foreign multinationals undercutting domestic 
firms and exploiting firm advantages with which African firms cannot compete. Broadman 
(2008) argues that home economy regulation and good governance as well as creative 
conducive investing environments or “world-class FDI policy regimes” is what African 
leaders should be focusing on.  If African states can draw in investors, not purely because of 
the abundance of resources or unexploited and uncompetitive markets, but because the 
environments in which these factors exist are favourable to investors and “basic market 
institutions” commercial activities in these host economies will be beneficial to foreign and 
local investors alike (Broadman, 2008). If African states wish to push the developmental 
agenda that so many governments on the continent speak of, Africa best focus on attaining 
economic growth through long-term rather than short term gains and strategies.  
 
6.3 Suggestions for Further Research  
Further research in which this study is set is not without potential, with research potential in 
comparative, state to state and state to region investments of Indian or Chinese OFDI and 
multinationals. Studies that assess the home to host economy movement of investments from 
emerging economies to emerging regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa or emerging regions to 
developed regions would be greatly beneficial as such research would not be wholly centred 
in factors resulting in outward expansion in a home economy or the pull factors in a host 
economy, but the linking of how the regulatory factors in both home and host economy create 
a symbiotic environment for investment.  
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While this study attempted to bridge the home and host economies, ‘home’ being either India 
or China and ‘host’ being Sub-Saharan Africa in general, a more specific possibly even 
sectoral specific study could prove to be remarkable in accounting for the investments of 
emerging economies and the locations of these investments. Building on this suggestion, a 
study that focuses on Sub-Saharan countries and their institutional frameworks, policies and 
openness to investment, relative to their market or resource endowments, could better explain 
the ‘pull factors’ that draw investors to some Sub-Saharan countries and not to others. A key 
focus of such a study could hinge on researching political stability and investments’ exposure 
to risk due to inept political and economic institutions, policy and legislation.   
 
Finally, there is potential for studies that consider future developments and the long term 
implications of increasing investments in Sub-Saharan Africa by emerging economies. From 
this perspective, trends in the last few years could provide the researcher with key data in 
completing research on long term investments and the presence of emerging economy 
multinationals. Such future studies could account for whether or not the mechanisms of 
South-South cooperation that India and China have sought on the continent have brought any 
long term developmental prospects for countries or simply perpetuated Africa’s 
underdeveloped and undiversified economies.  
 
6.4 Conclusion 
The study has outlined some of the key areas of interest; assessing the political economy of 
the outward expansion of Indian and Chinese firms in Africa. Part of India and China’s 
outward investment expansion on the continent is the goal of being an equal partner to 
African states, and leaders of the developing state bloc. It is also part of India and China 
shaping their investment strategies and objectives within this cooperation with strong state-
backing and regulatory regimes that have liberalised and streamlined.  India and China have 
created supportive institutional environments for their firms, both private and state-owned. 
India and China both are thus argued, from an IPE perspective, economic nationalist, as the 
state through reduced controls on capital mobility has prompted their firms to invest abroad 
to address inadequacies in energy supply, seek out new markets or become global brands and 
competitors.   
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The surge of FDI from emerging economies can be attributed to the aforementioned change 
in global economic and political dynamics, which are also be attributed to New Delhi and 
Beijing, as they encouraged local firms to ‘go global,’ shaped by home institutional factors. 
The changing global economy and the reconstituting of their institutional environments are 
indicative of the change each state wishes to engender in order to successfully execute their 
foreign policies, foreign policies that are becoming more determined by economic interests, 
as both India and China move towards addressing strategic energy requirements in their 
economies. India and China are by no means similar countries, both countries are complex, 
vast and diverse with populations that constitute over a quarter of the world’s populace, but 
their behaviour and actions as emerging economies are at times difficult to differentiate.  
 
Both countries became economic powerhouses after decades of restrictive state controlled 
economic policy in the post-independence era. In the new era of global flux and financial 
crises, India and China retain high growth rates, remaining highly motivated to trade and 
invest in foreign markets. With continued economic growth rates, growing populations and 
demanding economies, competitive firms and even more competitive multinationals, the 
presence of India and China in the global economy is increasingly moving to one of 
solidification, not emergence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
76 
 
Bibliography 
 
Adem, S. 2010. The Paradox of China’s Policy in Africa. African and Asian Studies, 9: 334-
355. 
 
Adisu, K., Sharkey, T., and Okoroafo. 2010. The Impact of Chinese Investment in Africa. 
International Journal of Business and Management, 5(9): 3 – 9.  
 
Africa Development Bank Group. 2011. Africa’s Economic Growth Rate Forecast to Fall in 
2011 to 3.7 Percent from 4.9 Percent. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/africas-economic-growth-rate-forecast-to-
fall-in-2011-to-3-7-percent-from-4-9-percent-8067 . [10 September 2011].  
 
Ahearn, R.J. 2011. Congressional Research Service. Rising Economic Powers and the Global 
Economy: Trends and Issues for Congress. [Online]. Available:  
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41969.pdf . [1 October 2011].  
 
Alden, C. 2009. Emerging powers and Africa: a comparison of modes of engagement pursued 
by China, India and Brazil. Global Review, 2: 62 – 74. 
 
Alden, C., and Davis, M. 2006. A Profile of Operations of Chinese Multinationals in Africa. 
South African Journal of International Affairs, 13 (1): 83 – 95.  
 
Alden, C. 2005. China in Africa. Survival, 47 (3): 147-164.  
 
Arief A., Weiss, M.A., and Jones V.C (2009) The Global Economic Crisis: Impact on Sub-
Saharan Africa and Global Policy Responses. [Online]. Available: 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40778_20100406.pdf  [16 August 2011] 
 
Asiedu, E. 2006. Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: The Role of Natural Resources, 
Market Size, Government Policy, Institutions and Political Instability. The World Economy, 
29 (1): 63 – 77. 
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
77 
 
Athreye, S., and Kapur, S. 2009. Introduction: The internationalization of Chinese and Indian 
firms-trends, motivations and strategy. Industrial and Corporate Change, 18 (2): 209 – 221.  
 
Athukorala, P. Outward Foreign Direct Investment from India. Asia Development Review, 26 
(2): 125 – 153.  
 
Babbie, E. 2010. The Practice of Social Research. 12th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.  
 
Bakunina, A. 2008. India’s New M&A Mantra. Far Eastern Economic Review, 171 (1): 41 – 
44.  
 
Baldauf, S. 2011. India boosts bid to rival China in Africa. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2011/0525/India-boosts-bid-to-
rival-China-in-Africa . [27 October 2011].  
 
Barka, H.B. 2011. India’s Economic Engagement with Africa. Africa Economic Brief, 2(6): 1 
– 8.  
 
Barone, C.A. 1985. Marxist Thought on Imperialism: Survey and Critique. Armonk, New 
York: M.E Sharpe.   
 
Barry Jones, R.J. 2001. Routledge Encyclopaedia of International Political Economy. New  
York, NY: Routledge.  
 
Brautigam, D. 2010. Africa’s Eastern Promise: What the West Can Learn From Chinese 
Investment in Africa. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65916/deborah-brautigam/africa%E2%80%99s-
eastern-promise?page=show . [30 September 2011].  
 
Broadman, H.G. 2007a. Africa’s Silk Road: China and India’s New Economic Frontier. 
Washington, D.C: World Bank 
 
Broadman, H.G. 2007b. Connecting Africa and Asia. Finance and Development, 44 (2): 36 – 
39.  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
78 
 
Broadman, H.G. 2008. China and India Go to Africa: New Deals in the Developing World. 
Foreign Affairs, 87 (2): 95.  
 
Broadman, H.G. 2010. More Resilient Than Meets the Eye: Africa and The Global Economic 
Crisis. African Analyst. 5(1).  
 
Broadman, H.G. 2011. [Online]. Available: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/02/23/china-
and-indias-growing-investment-and-trade-with-africa . [28 September 2011]. 
 
Buckley, P.J., Clegg, J.L., Cross, A.R., Voss, H., Rhodes, M. and Zheng, P. 2008. Explaining 
China’s outward FDI: an institutional perspective, in Sauvant, K.P., Mendoza, K. and 
Irmak,I. 2008. The Rise of Transnational Corporations from Emerging Markets: Threat or 
Opportunity?. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.  
 
Buckley, P.J., N. Forsans, and S. Munjal. 2009. Foreign acquisitions by Indian multinational 
enterprises: a test of the eclectic paradigm,” paper presented at the  2009 Cambridge 
Symposium on International Manufacturing, Møller Centre, Cambridge, Sept. 24–25, 2009. 
 
Business Dictionary. 2011. Downstream. [Online]. Available:  
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/downstream.html . [29 October 2011].  
 
Business Dictionary. 2011. Upstream. [Online]. Available:  
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/upstream.html . [29 October 2011].  
 
Cambell, H. 2008. China in Africa: challenging US global hegemony. Third World 
Quarterly, 29 (1): 89 – 105.  
 
Campbell, K. 2011. India seeks natural resources in Africa but recognises continent’s 
development needs. [Online]. Available:  
http://www.miningweekly.com/article/india-seeks-natural-resources-in-africa-but-recognises-
the-continents-development-needs-2011-03-25 . [1 October 2011].  
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
79 
 
Chand, M. 2011. Chinese experts propose India-China-Africa trilateral. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.inewsone.com/2011/09/18/chinese-experts-propose-india-china-africa-
trilateral/77220 . [19 September 2011].  
 
Cheng, J.Y.S., and Shi, H. 2009. China’s African Policy in the Post – Cold War Era. Journal 
of Contemporary Asia, 39 (1): 87 – 115.  
 
Cheru, F. and Obi, C. 2011. Chinese and Indian Engagement in Africa: Competitive or 
Mutually Reinforcing Strategies. Journal of International Affairs, 64 (2): 91 – 110. 
 
Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS). 2011. Founding and Building up (1949 - 1955). 
[Online]. Available: 
http://english.cas.cn/ACAS/history/200908/t20090826_34227.shtml . 
[1 October 2011].  
 
Choudhury, C. 2011. India Spreads Its Wings in Africa: World View. [Online]. Available:  
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-01/india-spreads-its-wings-in-africa-world-
view.html . [ 28 September]. 
 
Cilliers, J. 2008. Africa in the New World: How Global and Domestic Developments will 
Impact by 2025. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. 
 
Cleeve, E. 2009. The Eclectic Paradigm and Foreign Direct Investment in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. In: IIABD (International Academy of African Business and Development), 
Proceedings of the 10th Annual Conference IAABD, Kampala, Uganda, 19 – 23 May 2009, 
235-245. The Institution.     
 
CNNMoney. 2011. [Online]. Available: 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2011/full_list/ . [28 September 2011]. 
 
Collier, P. 2007. The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Falling and What Can 
Be Done About It. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
80 
 
Cohen, S.D. 2007. Multinational Corporations and Foreign Direct Investment: Avoiding 
Simplicity, Embracing Complexity.  New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Connors, W. and Maylie, D. 2011. Nigeria Gives Huawei a Place to Prove Itself. [Online]. 
Available:  
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904279004576524742374778386.html . 
[30 September 2011]. 
 
Cornelissen, S. 2009. Awkward Embraces: Emerging and Established Powers and the 
Shifting Fortunes of Africa's International Relations in the Twenty-First Century. Politikon, 
36 (1): 5 – 26.  
 
Cropley, E., and Mahlich, G. 2011. Coal India seeks 10 mln tonnes from Mozambique. 
[Online]. Available: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/09/mozambique-mining-coal-
idUSLDE7080C120110109 . [2 October 2011].  
 
Deng, P. 2003. Foreign Investment by Multinationals from Emerging Countries: The Case of 
China. Journal of Leadership & Organisational Studies, 10 (2): 113 – 124. 
 
Deng, P. 2007. Investing for strategic resources and its rationale: The case of outward FDI 
from Chinese companies. Business Horizons, 50 (1): 71 – 81.   
 
Deng, P. 2008. Why do Chinese firms tend to acquire strategic assets in international 
expansion? Journal of World Business, 44 (1): 74 – 84.  
 
Desai, N. 2009. India and Africa: A New Engagement. India Quarterly: A Journal of 
International Affairs, 65 (4): 413 – 429.  
 
Dorrah, M. and Currie, C. 2008. Lubricated with oil: Iran – China relations in a changing 
world. Middle East Policy, 15 (2): 66 – 80.  
 
Dunning, J.H. 1988. Explaining International Production. Botson, MA. Unwin Hyman. 
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
81 
 
Dunning, J.H. 1993. Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy. New York, NY: 
Addison-Wesley.  
 
Dunning, J.H and Lundan, S.M 2008. Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy. 2nd 
ed. Cheltam, UK. Edward Elgar Publishing.   
 
Eden, L. 1991. Bring the Firm Back In: Multinationals in International Political Economy. 
Millennium – Journal of International Studies, 20 (2): 197 – 224.  
 
Duysters, G., Jacob, J. and Hu. J. (2008). Internationalization and Technological Catching Up 
of Emerging Multinationals: A Case Study of China’s Haier Group Working Paper (#2008-
052). [Online]. Available: http://arno.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=12736 . [16 July 2011]. 
 
Elango, B. and Pattnaik,C. 2007. Building capabilities for international operations through 
networks: a study of Indian firms. Journal of Business Studies, 38 (1): 541 – 555.   
 
Enerdata. 2010. Global Energy Statistical Yearbook 2011- Ranking major countries. 
[Online]. Available: 
http://yearbook.enerdata.net/#/2010-energy-consumption-data.html . [4 October 2011].   
 
French, H.W. 2010. The Next Empire. [Online]. Available:  
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/05/the-next-empire/8018/    
[28 September 2011].  
 
Gamble, A. 2009. The Spectre at the Feast. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Gammeloft, P., Barnard, H. and Madhok, A. 2010. Emerging multinationals, emerging 
theory: Macro- and micro-level perspectives. Journal of International Management, 16 (2): 
95 – 101.   
 
Gill, B., and Reilly, K. 2007. The Tenous Hold of China Inc. in Africa. Washington 
Quarterly, 30 (30): 37 – 52.  
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
82 
 
Gilpin, Robert. 2001. Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic 
Order. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.  
 
Global Telecoms Business. 2011. South Africa fibre project appoints ZTE. [Online]. 
Available:  
http://www.globaltelecomsbusiness.com/Article/2906681/South-Africa-fibre-project-
appoints-ZTE.html?ArticleID=2906681 . [27 September 2011].  
 
Griffiths, M., Roach, R.C.and Solomon, S.M. 2009. 50 Key Thinkers in International 
Relations. Oxon: Routledge.   
 
Gugler, P. 2008. Chinese companies worldwide. [Online]. Available:  
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/1565 . [29 September 2011]. 
 
Hansen, M. W. 2010. In Search of the “Indianness” of Indian Multinational Enterprises: Is 
There Anything Special about the Indian Path to Outward Foreign Direct Investment, in 
Sauvant, K.P., Pradhan, J.P., Chatterjee, A. and Harley, B. (eds) 2010. The Rise of Indian 
Multinationals: Perspectives on Indian Outward Foreign Direct Investment. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 25 – 55. 
 
Hattari, R., and Rajan, R.S. 2010. India as a Source of Outward Foreign Direct Investment. 
Oxford Development Studies, 38 (4): 497 – 518.  
 
Holliday, G. 2011. Bharti Airtel Rwanda entry seen spurring pricewar. Online. Available:  
http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/09/14/rwanda-telecoms-idINL5E7KE0ZK20110914 . [4 
October 2011].  
 
Hong, Z. 2007. China’s Oil Venture in Africa. East Asia, 24 (1): 399 -415.  
 
Hong, Z. 2011. The Expansion of Outward FDI: A Comparative Study of China and India. 
China: An International Journal, 9 (1): 1-25.  
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
83 
 
Huawei.com, 2011. Corporate Governance. [Online]. Available:  
http://www.huawei.com/en/about-huawei/corporate-info/coporate-governance/index.htm .  
[1 October 2011].  
 
Hofstedt, T. A, Cmdr (USN). China in Africa An Africom Response. Naval War College 
Review, 62 (3): 79 – 96.  
 
Jones, M. 2011. Haier Tops Global Appliances Rankings Again. [Online]. Available:  
http://www.channelnews.com.au/Appliances/Kitchen/W7A8M4N9 . [3 October 2011].  
 
Kornegay, F.A., and Landsberg, C. 2009. Engaging Emerging Powers: Africa's Search for a 
'Common Position'. Politikon, 36 (1): 171 - 191. 
 
Kolstad, I and Wiig, A. 2011. Better the Devil You Know? Chinese Foreign Direct 
Investment in Africa. Journal of African Business, 12 (1) 31 – 50.  
 
Lai, H.H. China’s Oil Diplomacy: is it a global security threat? Third World Quarterly, 28 
(3): 519 – 537.   
 
Lai, H.H. 2007. China’s oil diplomacy: Is it a global threat? Third World Quarterly, 28(3): 
519 – 537.  
 
Lamont, J. 2011. Indian multinationals double overseas investments. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/international-news/global-
exchange/financial-times/indian-multinationals-double-overseas-investments/article2073938/ 
. [11 September 2011]  
 
Lau, J. 2010. Sinopec to buy more upstream assets. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1ff74102-3b70-11df-
b62200144feabdc0.html#axzz1ZXkd7exa . [29 September 2011]. 
 
Legend Holdings. 2011. Company Profile. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.legendholdings.com.cn/intro_en.asp . [1 October 2011].  
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
84 
 
Li, A. 2007. China and Africa: Policy and Challenges. China Security, 3(3): 69 – 93. 
 
Luo, Y., Xue, Q. and Han, B. 2010. How emerging market governments promote outward 
FDI: Experience from China. Journal of World Business, 45 (1): 68 – 79.  
 
Kaplinsky, R. and Morris, M. 2009. Chinese FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa: Engaging with 
Large Dragons. European Journal of Development Research, 21 (4): 551 – 569.   
 
Kumar, N. 2007. Emerging TNCs: trends, patterns and determinants of outward FDI by 
Indian enterprises. Transnational Corporations, 16 (1): 1 – 27.  
 
Mawdsley, E. and McCann, G. 2010. The Elephant in the Corner? Reviewing India-Africa 
Relations in the New Millennium. Geography Compass, 4 (2): 81 - 93.  
 
Mbeki, M. 2009. Architects of Poverty: Why African Capitalism Needs Changing. 
Johannesburg: Picador Africa.  
 
Mbeki, M. (ed). 2011. Advocates for Change: How to Overcome Africa’s Challenges. 
Johannesburg: Picador Africa. 
 
Martin, W.G. 2008. Africa's Futures: from North – South to East – South?. Third World 
Quarterly, 29 (2): 339-356.  
 
McDonald, M. 2011. China’s Destiny is Africa’s biggest opportunity. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.businesslive.co.za/africa/africa_markets/2011/09/24/china-s-destiny-is-africa-s-
biggest-opportunity . [25 September 2011].  
 
Michel, Serge. 2008. ‘When China Met Africa’. Foreign Policy May/June 166: 38-46. 
Mohan, G., and Marcus, P. 2009. Africa, China and the ‘new’ economic geography of 
development. Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, 30(1): 24 - 28. 
 
Mounton, J. 2001. How to succeed in your Master’s & Doctoral Studies. Pretoria: Van 
Schaik Publishers.   
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
85 
 
Morck, R., Yeung, B., and Zhao, M. 2008. Perpsectives on China’s outward foreign direct 
investment. Journal of International Business Studies, 39(3): 337 – 350.  
 
Naidu, S. 2008. India’s Growing African Strategy. Review of African Political Economy. 35 
(115): 116 – 128.  
 
Naidu, S., Corkin, L. and Herman, Hayley. 2009. China's (Re)-Emerging Relations with 
Africa: Forging a New Consensus?. Politikon, 36 (1): 87 – 115. 
 
Nye, Joseph S., Jr. 2010. The Future of American Power: dominance and decline in 
perspective. Foreign Affairs, 89 (6): 2 - 12.  
 
Nayyar, D. 2008. The Internationalisation of Firms From India: Investment, Mergers and 
Acquisitions. Oxford Development Studies, 36 (1): 111 - 131.    
 
Naidoo, B. 2011. Tata unveils new additions to SA commercial vehicle range. [Available]. 
Online: 
http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/tata-launched-new-addition-to-commercial-
vehicle-fleet-2011-10-07 . [10 October 2011].  
 
Ng’wanakilala, F. 2011. China, Tanzania sign R25bn coal, ore deal. The New Age: 20, 
September 23. 
 
O’Brien, R., and Williams, M. 2004. Global Political Economy Evolution and Dynamics. 
London: Palgrave MacMillan. 
 
O’Brien, R., and Williams, M. 2007. Global Political Economy Evolution and Dynamics. 2nd 
ed. London: Palgrave MacMillan. 
 
O’Brien, R., and Williams, M. 2010. Global Political Economy Evolution and Dynamics. 3rd 
ed. London: Palgrave MacMillan. 
 
O’Neill, John. 2001. Building Better Global Economic BRICs, Goldman Sachs Global 
Economics Paper, 66, New York 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
86 
 
Osei, B. and Mubiru, A.M. 2010. Chinese Trade and Investment Activities in Africa. 
[Online]. Available: 
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Chinese%20Trade%20
%20Investment%20Activities%20in%20Africa%2020Aug.pdf . [24 October 2011].  
 
Pal, P. 2010. The Surge in Indian Outbound Foreign Direct Investment to Africa: A New 
Form of South-South Cooperation?, in Sauvant, K.P., Pradhan, J.P., Chatterjee, A., and 
Harley, B. (eds) 2010. The Rise of Indian Multinationals: Perspectives on Indian Outward 
Foreign Direct Investment. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 256 – 275.  
 
Palan, R (ed). 2000. Global Political Economy: Contemporary Theories. London: Routledge. 
 
Palitza, K. 2011. Why Zambia's Elections Will Be All About China. [Online]. Available:  
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2093381,00.html  . [20 September 2011].  
 
Pant, H.V. 2008. China in Africa: The Push Continues But All’s Not Well. Defense & 
Security Analysis, 24 (1): 33 – 43.  
 
Pasricha, A. 2010. Indian Companies Push into Africa. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/asia/Indian-Companies-Push-into-Africa-to-Explore-
Its-Growing-Business-Potential-105997178.html . [27 September 2011]. 
 
Pattanaik, R.K and Bhargavi, J. 2011. Maharashtra Economic Development Council: Cover 
Story - Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI): An Indian Perspective. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.medcindia.org/Digest/June%202011/Cover%20Story.pdf . [31 August 
2011].   
 
Pham, P.J. 2006. China’s African Strategy and Its Implications for U.S. Interests. American 
Foreign Policy, 28 (1): 239 – 253. 
 
Pham, P.J. 2007.  India’s Expanding Relations with Africa and Their Implications for U.S. 
Interests. America Foreign Policy Interests. 29: 341 – 352.  
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
87 
 
Pedersen, J.D. 2008. The Second Wave of Indian Investments Abroad. Journal of 
Contemporary Asia, 38 (4): 613 – 637.  
 
Pedersen, J.D 2010. Political Factors Behind the Rise of Indian Multinational Enterprises: An 
Essay in Political Economy, in Sauvant, K.P., Pradhan, J.P., Chatterjee, A., and Harley, B. 
(eds) 2010. The Rise of Indian Multinationals: Perspectives on Indian Outward Foreign 
Direct Investment. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 57 – 77.  
 
Pila, M. 2011. Huawei Heads to Africa as Presence Falters in Asia, Europe. [Online]. 
Available: 
http://siliconangle.com/blog/2011/09/13/huawei-heads-to-africa-as-presence-falters-in-asia-
europe/ . [30 September 2011].  
 
Pradhan, J.P. 2008. Rise of Indian Outward FDI: What Implications Does it Hold for Host 
Developing Countries? Economía: teoría y práctica, 29: 9 – 49.  
 
Pradhan, J.P 2010a. Strategic Asset-Seeking Activities of Emerging Multinationals: 
Perspective on Foreign Acquisitions by Indian Pharmaceutical MNEs. Organisations and 
Markets in Emerging Economies, 1(2): 9 – 31. 
 
Pradhan, J.P. 2010b. The global economic crisis: impact on Indian outward investment. 
Transnational Corporations, 19 (1): 69 – 84.  
 
Pradhan, J.P. and Lazaroiu. 2011. Rise of Emerging Economies: An Introduction. Economics, 
Management and Financial Markets, 6 (1): 8 – 18.  
 
Pretorius, L. 2011. Oil & Gas – China investing to secure energy supply: Chance to get a 
grip. [Online]. Available: http://www.fm.co.za/Article.aspx?id=154652 . [30 September 
2011]. 
 
Ramamurti, R., and Sing, J.V. (eds.) 2009. Emerging Multinationals in Emerging Markets. 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.  
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
88 
 
Renard, M. 2011. China’s trade and FDI in Africa, in Schiere, R., Ndikumana, L. and 
Walkenhorst, P. (eds.) 2011. African Development Bank Group: Tunisia. p. 25 – 51.  
 
Republic of India. 2006. Planning Commission. Integrated Energy Policy. New Delhi: 
Government Printer.  
 
Rugman, A.M. 2009. Theoretical aspects of MNE’s from emerging economies, in 
Ramamurti, R., and Singh, J.V. (eds.) 2009. Emerging Multinationals in Emerging Markets. 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. p. 42 – 64.  
 
Sáez, L., and Chang, C. 2009. The political economy of global firms from India and China. 
Contemporary Politics, 15 (3): 265 – 286.  
 
Salehizadeh, M. 2007. Emerging Economies’ Multinationals: Current Status and Future 
Prospects. Third World Quarterly, 28 (6): 1151 – 1166.   
 
Sauvant, K.P., Pradhan, J.P., Chatterjee, A., and Harley, B. (eds) 2010. The Rise of Indian 
Multinationals: Perspectives on Indian Outward Foreign Direct Investment. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Sauvant, K.P., Mendoza, K. and Irmak,I. 2008. The Rise of Transnational Corporations from 
Emerging Markets: Threat or Opportunity?. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.  
 
Sharma, A. 2007. India and Africa: Partnership in the 21st Century. South African Journal of 
International Affairs, 14 (2): 13 – 20.  
 
Shaw, T.M., Cooper, A.F and Chin, G.T. 2009. Emerging Powers and Africa: Implications 
for/from Global Governance?. Politikon, 36 (1): 27- 44. 
 
Shenkar, O. 2009. Becoming multinational: challenges for Chinese firms. Journal of Chinese 
Economic and Foreign Trade Studies. 3 (2): 149 – 162.  
 
Schoeman, M. 2011. Of BRICS and Mortar: The Growing Relations between Africa and the 
Global South. The International Spectator, 46 (1): 33 – 51.  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
89 
 
Sparks, D.L. 2011. India and China’s growing economic involvement in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Journal of African Studies and Development, 3 (4): 65 – 75.  
 
Staton, T. 2009. Glaxo, Dr. Reddy’s team up in emerging markets. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.fiercepharma.com/story/glaxo-dr-reddys-team-emerging-markets/2009-06-15 . [ 
4 October 2011].  
 
Strange, S. 1988. States and Markets: An Introduction to International Political Economy. 
London: Printer Publishers Limited.  
Strange, S. 1992. States, firms and diplomacy. International Affairs, 68 (1): 1 – 15. 
 
Taylor, I. 1998. China’s Foreign Policy towards Africa in the 1990s. Journal of 
Modern African Studies, 36 (3).  
 
Taylor, I. 2008. Sino – African Relations and the Problem of Human Rights. African Affairs, 
107 (426): 63 – 87. 
 
The Boston Consulting Group., 2010. BCG Focus. The African Challengers: Global 
Competitors Emerge from the Overlooked Continent. [Online]. The Boston Consulting 
Group. Available: 
www.bcg.com/documents/file44610.pdf . [8 September 2011].  
 
The Boston Consulting Group., 2011. BCG Report: Companies on the Move: Rising Stars 
from Rapidly Developing Economies are Reshaping Global Industries. [Online]. The Boston 
Consulting Group. Available: www.bcg.com/documents/file70055.pdf . [8 September 2011].      
 
The Economist. 2011. The Chinese in Africa: Trying to pull together. [Online]. Available:  
http://www.economist.com/node/18586448 . [13 October 2011].  
 
The Economic Times/The Times of India. 2011. ONGC Videsh loses bid to buy stake in 
Angola oil block. [Online]. Available: 
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-03-14/news/28688138_1_oil-block-ovl-
proposal-sonangol-p-p . [1 October 2011].  
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
90 
 
Economist Intelligence Unit. 2007. World Investment Prospects: Foreign Direct Investment 
and the Challenge of Political Risk.   
 
Tolentino, P.E. 2010. Home country macroeconomic factors and outward FDI of China and 
India. Journal of International Management. 16. (2): 102 – 120. 
 
Tripathy, D. 2010. Bharti closes $9 billion Zain Africa deal. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/08/us-zain-bharti-idUSTRE6570VJ20100608 . 
[30 September 2011].  
 
UNCTAD. 2006. World Investment Report 2006. New York and Geneva: United Nations. 
 
UNCTAD. 2007. World Investment Report 2007. New York and Geneva: United Nations. 
 
UNCTAD. 2008. World Investment Report 2008. New York and Geneva: United Nations. 
 
UNCTAD. 2009. World Investment Report 2009. New York and Geneva: United Nations. 
 
UNCTAD. 2010a. Economic Development in Africa Report 2010. New York and Geneva: 
United Nations.  
 
UNCTAD. 2010b. World Investment Report 2010. New York and Geneva: United Nations. 
 
UNCTAD. 2011. World Investment Report 2011. New York and Geneva: United Nations. 
 
UNECA. 2011. Economic Report on Africa 2011. Addis Ababa: United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa.  
 
UNIDO and UNCTAD. 2011. Special Issue: Economic Development in Africa Report 2011. 
New York and Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development/United 
Nations Industrial Development Organisation.  
 
Van der Lugt, S., Hamblin, V., Burgess, M., & Schickerling, E. 2011. Assessing China’s Role 
in Foreign Direct Investment in Southern Africa. Stellenbosch: Centre for Chinese Studies. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
91 
 
Venter, I. 2011. Tata confirms SA plant plan. [Online]. Available:  
http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/tata-confirms-sa-plant-plan-2011-07-08 . 
[10 October 2011].  
 
Walter, A., and Sen, G. 2009: Analyzing the Global Political Economy. New Jersey, USA: 
Princeton University Press.  
 
Weingast, B.R, and Wittman, D.A (eds). 2006. The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Winters, A.L. and Yusuf, S. eds. 2007. Dancing with giants: China, India and the Global 
Economy. Washington, DC. The World Bank.  
 
World Bank. 2011. Africa: Sub-Saharan Africa. [Online]. Available:  
http://go.worldbank.org/0KBY1V9YT0 . [28 September 2011].  
 
Wysoczańska, K. 2011. Sino-Indian co-operation in Africa: Joint efforts in the oil sector. 
Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 29 (2): 193 – 201.  
Yeoh, P.L 2011. Location choice and the internationalization sequence: Insights from Indian 
pharmaceutical companies. International Marketing Review, 28 (3): 291-312.  
 
Yueng, H.W. and Liu, W. 2008. Globalizing China: The Rise of Mainland Firms in the 
Global Economy. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 49 (1): 57 – 86.  
 
Zafar, Ali. 2007. The Growing Relationship Between China and Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Macroeconomic, Trade, Investment, and Aid Links. The World Bank Research Observer, 22 
(1): 103 – 130.  
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
